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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Rapid Appraisal of the Implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash 
Transfer Program (BLT) and Beneficiary Assessment of the 2005 
Direct Cash Transfer Program in Indonesia 
Meuthia Rosfadhila, Nina Toyamah, Bambang Sulaksono, Silvia Devina, 
 Robert Justin Sodo, and Muhammad Syukri 
 
 
This report is the result of a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash 
Transfer (BLT) program and community perceptions of the stigma which emerged during the 
implementation of the BLT 2005 program. Early observations and assessment of the 
implementation of the program are essential in understanding the achievement level and 
problems associated with the program. This information can be used as a learning tool to 
improve the implementation and planning of the program in the future. 
 
This study used qualitative methods including in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions (FGD) as well as quantitative methods. Although there were some weaknesses, 
generally the results of this study show that the implementation of the 2008 Direct Cash 
Transfer was a great improvement from that of the 2005 Direct Cash Transfer, particularly 
in regard to the socialization process, distribution of cards, and disbursement of funds. 
Weaknesses were generally related to institutional issues, accuracy of targeting, and the 
handling of problems/complaints. Based on community perceptions, BLT can, in a limited 
way, help satisfy living needs in the short term. This study uncovers cases of BLT being 
deducted in some areas. Although there was mistargeting to a limited extent, BLT did not 
discourage participation in the work force. Conflict occurred in some cases but did not lead 
to anarchic behavior. 
 
 
Keywords: Direct cash transfer, evaluation, program implementation 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Research Background and Objectives 
 
In 2008 the Government of Indonesia (GoI) decided to increase the domestic fuel price as it 
had in 2005 due to a rise in international fuel prices to above US$120 per barrel and to address 
the fact that the government’s fuel subsidy tended to benefit the middle and upper classes 
more than the lower class. In addition, the decision was made to prevent the increasing 
frequency of subsidized fuel being smuggled abroad. To mitigate the negative impact of the 
increase, the government then re-launched the Direct Cash Transfer (BLT) program. This 
program involved 19.02 million targeted households (RTS) being eligible to receive Rp100,000 
every month for seven months—from June to December 2008. The total BLT transfer 
amount of Rp700,000 was distributed to eligible households in two installments—Rp300,000 
and Rp400,000 respectively. 
 
To look into the implementation process of the 2008 BLT program while taking into account the 
lessons learned from the implementation of the 2005 BLT program, it was deemed to be essential 
to conduct a rapid appraisal of the 2008 BLT program implementation and an evaluation of the 
2005 BLT program beneficiaries. Funded by the World Bank, the SMERU Research Institute 
conducted a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the first stage of the 2008 BLT program. 
During this study, in addition to examining the technical aspects of the program, SMERU also 
carried out a beneficiary assessment—in particular regarding the community’s negative perceptions 
of the 2005 BLT program—as well as an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of other 
poverty reduction programs and how these programs compare with the 2008 BLT. 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
The SMERU 2008 BLT study used the qualitative approach, complemented by quantitative 
data. Data collection was conducted through focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth 
interviews with informants/respondents who were directly connected with the BLT 
implementation—from across the central, kabupaten/kota (district/city), kecamatan (subdistrict), 
village/kelurahan,i and household levels—and an appraisal of documents and study findings 
from the 2005 BLT as well as documents related to the implementation of the 2008 BLT. 
 
Two types of FGDs were conducted in each sample kabupaten/kota, these being FGDs seeking 
recommendations and FGDs classifying the participating households’ welfare status, each of 
which required female participation. The FGDs seeking recommendations, on the one hand, were 
held to collect information on the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, including the 
problems that arose and the recommended solutions. The FGDs at the kabupaten/kota level 
involved only the various elements or government agencies related to the BLT, while the FGDs at 
the village/kelurahan level engaged participants from among village/kelurahan officials, 
community/religious/youth leaders, and posyandu (integrated health service post)ii cadres. On the 
                                                 
iA kelurahan is a village-level administrative area located in an urban center. 
iiA posyandu or an integrated health service post is a medium for a village/kelurahan/RW community to provide basic 
health services for its own members. The main objective is to help reduce Under-Five and Maternal Mortality Rates. 
The services, given by local PKK cadres assisted by a medical staff member of the local community health center, 
include immunization, weight measuring, and general health check for children under the age of five as well as 
general health check for mothers and the elderly. 
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other hand, the FGDs classifying household welfare were aimed at obtaining information on 
welfare rankings to evaluate aspects of program undercoverage and leakage at the dusun/RWiii 
level. At the village/kelurahan level, these FGDs were held separately for male and female 
beneficiaries, involving representatives from each area within the village/kelurahan. 
 
This study was conducted in the five sample kabupaten/kota that were used similarly by 
SMERU as sample kabupaten/kota during the 2005 BLT program evaluation study. SMERU 
deliberately chose the same areas so that the findings of this study can be compared with 
those of the 2005 BLT program implementation study. The study’s research activities, report 
writing, and workshop were scheduled to take place over 15 weeks, from August 2008 to the 
end of November 2008. However, due to some technical problems and the political situation 
in Indonesia at that time (specifically the 2009 general election), there was a delay so that the 
final report in English could not be finished until the beginning of October 2009. 
 
 
General Findings 
 
The technical aspects studied as part of the first stage of the 2008 BLT study were the 
institutional issues, program socialization, verification and accuracy of targeting, channeling of 
funds, complaints and problem solving, and the levels of satisfaction regarding the 
implementation of the program. Several aspects of the beneficiaries’ perspectives were 
examined to gain an understanding of the community’s true perceptions regarding some of the 
more common negative impressions surrounding the implementation of the 2008 BLT. 
 
Institutional Issues 
  
Compared to the role of institutions in the implementation of the 2005 BLT, the role of 
institutions in the 2008 BLT was perceived to have improved, particularly regarding the 
delegation of tasks and authority from the central government level to the kabupaten/kota level, 
although some flaws were still evident. Clearly seen in the lack of coordination and 
consolidation among institutions and government agencies, the flaws were caused by (i) 
unclear division of authority among the government agencies, (ii) delayed budget realization 
for coordination meetings and for the implementation of the BLT-RTS from the provincial 
level to the kabupaten/kota level, (iii) complicated bureaucratic process, and (iv) confusion over 
the actual objectives and characteristics of the 2008 BLT program. In addition, another 
problem regarding institutional issues was the negative perceptions of the program from some 
government apparatus, NGOs, and media agencies that considered the BLT programs as 
playing a part in making people lazy and overly consumptive. Several stakeholders suggested 
that a community empowerment program replace the BLT program. 
 
Socialization 
 
In general, the socialization of the 2008 BLT program, particularly that regarding funds 
disbursement, was done competently. However, there were still weaknesses evident in terms 
of the emphasis of what the BLT actually is, the background and objectives of the BLT 
program, and the criteria of eligible beneficiaries. Socialization of these details was essential to 
minimizing local conflict and increasing the community’s monitoring role. 
  
                                                 
iiiA dusun is an administrative area within a village consisting of a number of RT (neighborhood units). An RW is 
a unit of local administration within a kelurahan consisting of several RT. 
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Verification and Accuracy of Targeting 
 
The process of verifying the eligibility of BLT beneficiaries was for the most part conducted 
by the village/kelurahan apparatus without involving other elements of the community, under 
the cloak of time and resource constraints and for fear of inciting local conflicts. Additionally, 
in almost every sample area, the verification process was only carried out to check on BLT 
beneficiaries who were now deceased or had moved, while, in fact, the verification process 
should have been used to check whether a household was still eligible to receive the BLT 
funds or had experienced an improvement in their welfare status. Concerns were not raised so 
long as the number of new/replacement RTS did not exceed the number of revoked ones. 
 
A majority of respondents claimed that they were aware of some poor households not being 
able to  access BLT funds while some non-poor households received the funds. The policy 
not to replace the RTS who had moved or died or whose welfare status had improved in order 
to avoid inciting local conflict, by all levels of government, from the provincial/kabupaten/kota 
to the village/RW/RT, was in fact the major reason why the inaccuracy of targeting in the 
2008 BLT program worsened. 
 
Channeling of Funds 
 
By and large, the process of distributing the fuel compensation cards (KKB) to the RTS went 
relatively smoothly, although there were still cases of misprints of beneficiaries’ names and 
addresses. The transfer of the KKB from the kabupaten/kota inspection post office (KPRK) to 
the village heads depended largely on how long the verification process took. The location of 
the village was also an influencing factor on the KKB distribution process. The greater the 
distance between the village and the nearest KPRK, the shorter the time between the KKB 
distribution and the BLT funds disbursement. There was no evidence of any unauthorized 
levies being collected from the RTS during the KKB distribution process. 
 
The disbursement of the 2008 BLT funds was conducted relatively better than that of the 
2005 BLT funds owing to some improvements made by PT Pos, which had taken steps to 
increase the number of disbursement points, counters, and staff members as well as the 
engagement of security staff and officials. For the most part the RTS received the full amount 
of the BLT funds from the post office. 
 
Complaints and Problem Solving 
 
The majority of complaints received were related to the RTS data, such as the unclear criteria 
for identifying eligible beneficiaries, target setting, and the number of beneficiaries. 
Unfortunately, there were no specific units for handling complaints in the study areas, so the 
public can only file their complaints with the related agencies from the village/kelurahan level 
to the kabupaten/kota level without a clear handling mechanism in place. 
 
Satisfaction Levels 
 
The results of the five FGDs with the kabupaten/kota elite and the ten FGDs with the 
village/kelurahan elite regarding the implementation of 2008 BLT program indicates that the 
satisfaction level of the kabupaten/kota elite is higher than that of the village/kelurahan elite, 
except for the distribution of the KKB stage of the program. This situation is similar to that 
of the implementation of 2005 BLT. The targeting stage was the most unsatisfactory for the 
village elite. This is significantly different from the satisfaction level of the kabupaten/kota elite 
regarding this particular stage of the BLT implementation. The low level of satisfaction of the 
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village elite is due to the fact that they had to face the anger of villagers who did not receive 
the funds as a result of mistargeting. Furthermore, the socialization stage was the most 
unsatisfactory, especially for the kabupaten/kota elite, in both 2005 and 2008. 
 
In regard to the RTSs’ satisfaction levels with the implementation of the 2008 BLT, the results 
of the FGDs indicate that there is no significant difference in the levels of satisfaction 
between the female and male participants. However, there was a tendency for the satisfaction 
levels of the male participants with problem solving, program socialization, and distribution of 
the KKB to be higher than that of the female participants. In contrast, the female participants 
showed higher levels of satisfaction than the male participants in terms of the amount of 
money being received and the accuracy of RTS targeting. 
 
Similar to the elites, the RTS also stated that the KKB distribution as well as the funds 
disbursement were the most satisfactory stages, especially for their relatively smooth 
implementation process. In contrast, the RTS considered the accuracy of targeting and the 
amount of money being received as the most unsatisfactory. During the 2005 BLT program 
implementation, the socialization stage was regarded as the most unsatisfactory for the 
beneficiaries. However, during the 2008 BLT, the RTS were quite satisfied and thought they 
had been given adequate information regarding schedules, requirements, and procedures of 
the BLT funds disbursement. 
 
In general, the RTS participating in the FGDs could not wholly understand and identify the 
institutions organizing the BLT program. They did not know the roles of the institutions 
above the village/kelurahan level, except for the post office. Therefore, the RTSs’ satisfaction 
level assessment of the institutional work performance was limited to the village/kelurahan-
level institutions and the post office only. 
 
Community Perceptions of the Negative Impressions surrounding the Implementation 
of the 2008 BLT 
 
There were negative impressions formed of the 2008 BLT program, namely (i) the BLT 
cannot cushion the shock of the sudden rise of the price of fuel; (ii) the targeting of the BLT 
is not accurate; (iii) the BLT is prone to corrupt practices; (iv) the BLT creates local conflict; 
and (v) the BLT creates negative incentive to labor force participation. Here are the 
community’s perceptions of the negative impressions attached to the 2008 BLT program. 
 
1. The RTS generally claimed that the funds that they received could assist in improving 
their economic circumstance. However, they thought that the amount was not adequate. 
This is because they compared the 2008 BLT funds with the ever-rising prices of their 
daily needs. 
 
2. Most informants at the community level said that there were poor households who 
deserved BLT funds but did not appear on the list of BLT beneficiaries. The targeting 
inaccuracy was caused by (i) unclear criteria for identifying poor households; (ii) partial 
(due to quota requirements) and distorted (due to nepotism) data collection mechanisms; 
and (iii) the data collectors’ as well as the listed RTSs’ questionable integrity. 
 
3. Fund distribution programs to large sections of society are often vulnerable to corrupt 
practices, for example, in the form of deductions—either authorized or unauthorized. In 
the 2008 BLT program, these deductions were made for various reasons, but mostly 
involved a deal being struck between community leaders and the RTS. The BLT funds 
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deduction was also intended to avoid personal jealousies and conflicts within the 
community. Another reason was that the money from the deductions could help to fund 
numerous social activities, such as the Indonesia’s Independence Day ceremonies, as well 
as communal road construction projects, and religious activities. 
 
4. The implementation of the 2008 BLT program was much more conducive than that of 
the 2005 BLT program because, among other reasons, people were already apathetic and 
powerless, the issuance of local resolutions that enabled non-RTS to receive part of the 
BLT funds, statements from kecamatan officials that the non-RTS would receive the funds 
during the next distribution period, reduced political tensions in the regions, and the 
notion that the amount of funds distributed in the 2008 BLT program was relatively 
smaller than that in the 2005 BLT. In most cases there was only local tensions due to 
some individuals becoming envious or accusing others of being nepotistic during the 
targeting stage. 
 
5. The assumption of many people that the BLT program would make the beneficiaries lazy 
or reduce the beneficiaries’ working hours was not entirely proven. Most of the 
informants stated that the BLT funds distribution did not make the beneficiaries lazy 
because the size of the fund was too small to cover their daily needs. 
 
BLT Compared with Other Poverty Reduction Programs, according to BLT Beneficiaries 
 
Poverty reduction programs that have been implemented in Indonesia can be categorized into 
three groups, namely: (i) social/charitable programs—aid and social protection programs for 
specific groups such as the BLT, PKH (Family of Hope Program), Raskin (Rice for the Poor), 
Jamkesmas (Community Health Insurance), and BOS (School Operational Assistance); (ii) 
empowerment programs—PNPM Mandiri (National Community Empowerment Program); 
and (iii) programs for developing Micro-, Small- and Medium-scale Enterprises (UMKM). 
According to the majority of the program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the BLT 
programs are the best among poverty reduction programs in Indonesia. 
 
Overall, most of the program beneficiaries prefer the charitable programs over the 
empowerment and UMKM development programs. In contrast, most stakeholders stated that 
empowerment programs such as PNPM Mandiri, UMKM development, Farming 
Revitalization, and the Economic Empowerment of Coastal Communities (PEMP) were 
better than social/charitable programs as the empowerment programs did not only promote 
the welfare status of poor households but also gave them a higher level of status and dignity. 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Outlined here are several conclusions based on the study findings of the first stage of the 2008 
BLT program. 
1. The BLT program is still relevant and it can help the poor recover from the economic 
shock due to the sudden rise in the price of fuel. 
2. There were still tensions—and even conflict—at the community level, although with a 
lower intensity. Social envy and the nontransparent process of verification of the 
beneficiaries were prominent contributing factors. 
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3. Deductions from the BLT funds—authorized or unauthorized—were still made 
systematically with an increasing figure. This condition was not anticipated and taken care 
of by the program implementing apparatus. 
4. The BLT program does not make the RTS lazy and change the RTS’ overall working 
hours. The limited size of the funds received makes the poor think and act rationally. They 
continue working at their jobs to fulfill their increasing daily needs. 
5. There are still errors in the targeting process and there are poor households not listed as 
eligible beneficiaries due to some flaws during the verification process. 
 
Consequently, the continuation of the program requires several improvements in terms of its 
implementation. Presented here are some recommendations to be implemented. 
1. The RTS lists from Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) need to be verified 
by the community at the village consultation meeting—involving as much as possible all 
community elements—and be documented in an official report. Village officials should 
also be required to present the list of the RTS’ names on a community notice board so the 
village residents can provide feedback in case they have any objections to the list. 
2. People need to be made more aware of the fact that BLT funds are only available to 
eligible poor households by 
a) reaching out to more people during the socialization process, especially in relation to 
the program’s purpose, objectives, mechanisms, and targeting; 
b) giving explanations about the program, formally and informally, through various 
events such as village/dusun meetings, religious occasions, arisan,iv and other 
community’s social activities; 
c) distributing brochures and displaying posters at public places as well as disseminating 
information through, among other methods, public service announcements (PSA) in 
relevant mass media (printed and electronic). 
3. In order to prevent unauthorized deductions from the BLT funds for any purpose and on 
any grounds, bupati/walikotav need to issue a directive to related apparatus and agencies 
from the kabupaten (district)/kota (city) level to the village/kelurahan level—including the 
RTvi/RW—that prohibits BLT fund deductions and the letter should be distributed and 
displayed in public places. 
 
In addition to the three points above, there are also other factors that need to be taken into 
consideration. 
1. The KKB must be distributed after the verification process has been completed, so that 
those KKB that have been revoked cannot be misused. 
2. In relation to BLT funds disbursement, the following needs to be provided. 
a) Additional disbursement points, especially in areas which are remote and difficult to 
access. 
b) Additional counters and special counters for RTS who are elderly, sick, or having 
special needs. 
                                                 
ivAn arisan is a regular social gathering in which the members operate a rotating savings scheme. 
vA bupati is the head of a kabupaten (district). A walikota is the head of a kota (city). 
viAn RT, or a neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of 
households. 
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c) A queuing system (queuing numbers, designated queuing lines, security personnel, etc.). 
3. Complaint-handling centers need to be established at each of the administrative levels. 
a) At the kabupaten/kota level, the functioning of a complaint-handling center is inherent in 
the tasks and functions of the BLT-RTS program implementing unit (UPP BLT-RTS). 
b) At the kecamatan level, the functioning of the center is the responsibility of the head of 
the kecamatan. 
c) At the village level, the functioning of the center is the responsibility of the head of the 
village/kelurahan, overseen by the Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (Village Consultative 
Body)/kelurahan board with the involvement from the village/kelurahan youth 
organization and the community’s social workers.  
4. There needs to be a directive from the head of the kabupaten/kota clearly describing the tasks and 
functions of the agencies involved in the UPP BLT-RTS, especially at kabupaten/kota level.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In order to compensate poor households for an increase in the price of fuel, in 2008 the 
government again implemented a Direct Cash Transfer (BLT) program as it had in 2005. The 
constantly increasing price of oil in the international market to over US$120 per barrel and the 
fact that the government’s fuel subsidy has so far been more beneficial to the middle and 
upper classes rather than the poor provided the context for the decision to reduce the fuel 
subsidy that caused the increase in the national price of fuel. As well as this, there was concern 
that the large difference between the fuel price inside and outside the country could lead to an 
increase in smuggling fuel out of Indonesia. 
 
The increase in the fuel price led to an increase in the price of daily goods and services, which 
led to a decrease in the purchasing power of the community, especially of poor households. 
Through the Direct Cash Transfer program for targeted households1 (RTS – Rumah Tangga 
Sasaran)) the government gave compensation of Rp100,000 per month, distributed in two 
stages over seven months from June to December 2008, to the value of Rp300,000 and 
Rp400,000. The number of RTS was the total number of beneficiaries of BLT 2005/2006 
which was 19.1 million. This total was updated in 1000 kecamatan (subdistricts) through the 
Family of Hope Program (Program Keluarga Harapan) and the total was reduced to 19.02 
million RTS. 
 
Previous experience showed that the implementation of the distribution of BLT still faced 
many problems, particularly with targeting and socialization. Thus, with the re-implementation 
of this program, monitoring and evaluation of its implementation was needed to ensure that 
the program could be carried out effectively. Through funding support from the World Bank, 
The SMERU Research Institute has conducted a rapid appraisal of the implementation of the 
first stage of the 2008 BLT program. 
 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
This research aimed to evaluate the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, including 
institutional aspects, socialization, verification and accuracy of targeting, channeling of funds, 
and the handling of complaints and problems. The research also examined some aspects from 
the beneficiary’s perspective (beneficiary assessment) particularly to gain an understanding of 
the community’s true opinions about five negative perspectives which emerged during the 
implementation of the 2005 BLT program, that is: (i) BLT was not able to overcome the 
shock from the increased fuel price, (ii) the targeting of BLT was inaccurate, (iii) BLT created 
opportunities for corruption, (iv) the implementation of BLT caused conflict, and (v) BLT 
gives a disincentive for the beneficiaries to participate in the work force. 
 
This research also evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of other poverty reduction programs, 
such as PKH, Raskin (Rice for the Poor) and Jamkesmas (Community Health Insurance), 
compared to the 2008 BLT based on community opinions and beneficiary experiences. 
                                                 
1Before Presidential Instruction No. 3, 2008 was released the BLT program for RTS was originally called BLT 
Plus. BLT Plus beneficiaries were going to receive Rp100,000 in cash as well as assistance of food goods, such as 
cooking oil and sugar. 
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1.3 Research Methodology 
 
1.3.1 Research Approach and Stages 
 
This study uses a qualitative approach supplemented by a quantitative approach. Data was 
collected through focus group discussions (FGD) and in-depth interviews using interview 
guidelines and short questionnaires. In each kabupaten/kota (district/city) there were nine 
FGDs; one FGD at the kabupaten/kota level, two at the village level, and six at the community 
and RTS level. This research also included a literature review of documents and research 
results from the 2005 BLT  and documents related to the implementation of the 2008 BLT 
which were compared with the actual implementation of the 2005 BLT. Before visiting the 
five sample areas, direct observation of the implementation of BLT funds distribution was 
conducted in Kecamatan Pasir Kuda, Cianjur.  
 
Two types of FGDs were held in each kabupaten/kota: FGDs seeking recommendations and 
FGDs for classification of households’ welfare. The FGDs seeking recommendations sought 
information about the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, the problems faced by RTS, 
and recommendations to deal with each problem. There were eight to ten participants in each 
discussion. The FGD to classify household welfare was conducted to gain information about 
the household welfare levels, which was then used to evaluate the under coverage and leakage 
at the dusun (hamlet)/RW2 level. These FGDs had 10–15 people involved. Each FGD was 
required to have at least one female representative as a participant.  
 
At the kabupaten/kota level only FGDs seeking recommendations were held. These involved 
Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics or BPS), the post office, Social Affairs Agency, 
local government, Bappeda (Regional Development Planning Board), Information and 
Communication Agency (Infokom), BPM (Community Empowerment Body), tertiary 
institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the local media. At the village/kelurahan3 
level both recommendation and household welfare classification FGDs were conducted. 
Recommendation FGDs with the village/kelurahan elite included participants from the 
village/kelurahan staff, the head of the dusun/lorong4/RW/RT5, community/religious/youth 
figures, and personnel from the posyandu (integrated health service post). At the household 
level, the implementation of the recommendation FGDs differentiated between women’s and 
men’s beneficiary groups. For the classification of household welfare FGD, participants were 
representatives from one area in a village/kelurahan (lorong/dusun, RT, RW), including 
community figures, head of the dusun/lorong, RT, RW, midwives, and teachers, who 
understand the community living conditions in the particular village/kelurahan and consist of a 
mixture from the various welfare levels (rich/poor). 
 
1.3.2 Selecting Research Sample Areas 
 
The study was conducted in five sample kabupaten/kota which were the same as those for the 
previous study, also carried out by SMERU, for the 2005 BLT. The sample areas are 
Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah (Tapteng), Kabupaten Cianjur, Kabupaten Demak, Kabupaten 
Bima, and Kota Ternate (see Table 1.1). The same sample regions were deliberately selected so 
                                                 
2RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RT (neighborhood units). Dusun is a hamlet, or 
settlement smaller than a village. 
3A kelurahan is a village level administrative area located in an urban center 
4A lorong is literally a small street, but here refers to a small area within a neighborhood. 
5RT, or a neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration consisting of a number of households. 
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that a comparison could be made with the 2005 BLT implementation evaluation results. These 
five kabupaten/kota were selected for SMERU’s 2005 BLT study as they were spread across 
Indonesia, they had been research areas for previous SMERU studies and so a database about 
poor households was available, and these areas represented conducive and not conducive 
areas for the first step of the 2005 BLT implementation. 
 
In every sample kabupaten, except for Kota Ternate, the same two villages from the same two 
sample kecamatan as used in the 2005 BLT study were chosen. Due to the creation of new 
administrative regions, Kelurahan Kampung Pisang, which had previously been part of 
Kecamatan Ternate Selatan, was now part of Ternate Tengah. These changes caused a number 
of areas in Kelurahan Kampung Pisang to become part of a different kelurahan.  
 
Table 1. 2008 BLT Study Sample Areas 
Province Kabupaten/Kota Kecamatan Village/ Kelurahan 
North Sumatra Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sibabangun 
Sorkam 
Mombang Boru 
Pearaja 
West Java Kab. Cianjur Cugenang 
Cibeber 
Cibulakan 
Girimulya 
Central Java Kab. Demak Wedung Berahan Wetan 
Karang Tengah Wonoagung 
West Nusa Tenggara  Kab. Bima Monta 
Wera 
Simpasai 
Nunggi 
North Maluku Kota Ternate Ternate Tengah Kampung Pisang 
Ternate Selatan Fitu 
 
1.3.3 Number and Type of Respondents 
 
The informants and respondents who took part in this research are from parties directly 
related to the implementation of the BLT program; from the central, kabupaten/kota, 
kecamatan, village/kelurahan and household levels (see Table 1.2). Institutional informants 
included those from the Ministry of Social Affairs, local government (social affairs agency, the 
Regional Development Planning Board, information and communications agency, the 
Economic Sector), Statistics Indonesia at the central and kabupaten/kota levels, PT Pos6 (the 
Central Post Office in Jakarta, kabupaten/kota inspection post office (KPRK), kabupaten 
secondary post office, kecamatan post office), camat7, the police, and the village/lurah8 
head/secretary to the RT head. 
 
Household respondents who were interviewed were mostly the same as those interviewed in 
the 2005 BLT study and were divided into the 2005 BLT beneficiary households and poor 
nonbeneficiary households. Respondents for the 2008 BLT study consisted of the 2005 BLT 
respondents as well as some new respondents who were divided into four criteria: 2005 and 
2008 BLT beneficiary households, 2008 BLT beneficiary households, 2005 BLT beneficiary 
households, and poor nonbeneficiary households. In total there were 128 respondents, 
consisting of 90 RTS from the 2005 and 2008 BLT, 6 RTS 2008, 4 RTS 2005, and 28 
nonbeneficiaries. 
                                                 
6PT Pos is the state-owned post office. 
7A camat is the head of a kecamatan. 
8A lurah is the head of a kelurahan. 
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Table 2. Number and Type of Respondents for 2008 BLT Study 
Level Respondent Total 
1. Center 
1. Statistics Indonesia 1 
2. Post Office 1 
3. Ministry of Social Affairs 1 
2. Kabupaten/kota 
1. Statistics Indonesia 5 
2. Kabupaten/kota Inspection Post Office (KPRK) 5 
3. Local government (social sector, secretary to the 
kabupaten/kota  head/regional assistant) and/or Bappeda 6 
4. Dinsos (social affairs agency) 5 
5. Infokom (information and communications agency) 1 
6. BPM (Community Empowerment Body) 1 
7. Police 1 
8. Local Media 5 
9. Nongovernment organizations 3 
3. Kecamatan 
1. Statistics Indonesia/statistics staff 6 
2. Secondary Police Office 6 
3. Camat/Camat’s secretary 9 
4. PMD (village community empowerment) 1 
5. Police 2 
4. Village/ 
Kelurahan 
1. Village head/secretary/head of government affairs (kaur 
pemerintahan) 11 
2. Partners/Assistant Partners 4 
3. RW/dusun 14 
4. RT Head  16 
5. BPD (Village Consultative Body) 3 
6. Community Social Welfare Workers 12 
7. BLT 2005 and 2008 beneficiary households 90 
8. BLT 2008 beneficiary households 6 
9. BLT 2005 beneficiary households 4 
10. Poor nonbeneficiary households 28 
 
1.3.4 Research Team Members and Research Schedule  
 
The SMERU research team included twelve people: advisor Dr. Sudarno Sumarto and eleven 
researchers (Meuthia Rosfadhila, Nina Toyamah, Bambang Sulaksono, Silvia Devina, R. Justin 
Sodo, Eduwin Pakpahan, Nur Aini, Upik Sabainingrum, Muhammad Syukri, Dedi Ali Ahmad, 
and Sinta Satriana). These eleven researchers were divided into five teams who were each 
responsible for conducting research in one kabupaten/kota. Each team was assisted by a local 
researcher. These local researchers were Basyri Nasution, Pitriati Solihah, Fathur Rohman, 
Syahbudin Hadid, and Salha Marasaoly. Thus one team on average consisted of two SMERU 
researchers and one local researcher. 
 
The research activities took place over 15 weeks, starting from the second week of August 
2008. Field research in five kabupaten/kota was carried out simultaneously over 14 days, from 
24 August to 6 September 2008. The main findings and recommendations were completed at 
the end of September, followed by the writing of the draft report finishing at the end of 
October 2008. The final report was completed at the end of November 2008. 
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Table 3. 2008 BLT Research Schedule  
Activity 
August 2008 Sept 2008 Oct 2008 Nov 2008 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1.   Preparation stage and 
participants making observations                  
2.   Field research                  
3.   Data entry and analysis                 
4.   Writing up of main findings and     
      recommendations 
                
5.   Workshop                 
6.   Writing draft report                 
7.   Writing final report                  
8.   Translation of report                 
 
The implementation of several activities, like workshops, the writing of final reports, and the 
translating of reports, experienced a delay due to some technical problems. The political 
situation in Indonesia at that time—approaching the 2009 General Election—was also not 
conducive to carrying out the workshops so that it was not conducted on time. The World 
Bank even stipulated that they did not allow workshops to be carried out during the election. 
The workshops, which should have been carried out at the time of writing the new draft 
report, finally began to be carried out in July 2009, then continued with the writing of the final 
report up until August 2009. The final report in English was finished in early October 2009. 
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II. EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DIRECT CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM (BLT) 
 
 
2.1 Institutional Issues 
 
The BLT program was conducted through coordination across sectors which worked together 
based on each institution’s function and main tasks. Presidential Instruction (Inpres)  
No. 3/2008, which was the legal basis for the implementation of the 2008 BLT program, 
stated that the Ministry of Social Affairs, together with related government agencies, was 
responsible for channeling BLT funds. Through the Minister for Social Affairs Decree  
No. 28/HUK/2008, the Minister for Social Affairs selected PT Pos Indonesia and BRI as the 
implementers for the channeling of 2008 BLT funds to the RTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. BLT program organizational structure 
Source: Departemen Sosial RI, 2008. 
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As a unit for coordinating activities, as can be seen in Figure 1, a program implementing unit 
(UPP) was established at each government level from the central to the kecamatan. These UPP 
had the authority to carry out development, supervision, and program monitoring. The UPP 
were chaired by the department/agency/social affairs agency and were made up of members 
from various relevant government agencies, such as the Ministry for Communications and 
Information Technology, PMD, Statistics Indonesia, and Bappeda/regional secretaries. 
 
In contrast with the role of institutions in the implementation of the 2005 BLT, the 
involvement of institutions from the central level to the kabupaten/kota level in the 2008 BLT, 
particularly with regard to the delegation of tasks and authority, was more efficient. Various 
documents (Presidential Instruction No. 3, 2008 and Minister for Home Affairs Decree (SK) 
No. 541/1336/SJ, 2008 on the Implementation and Monitoring of BLT), had already been 
received before the distribution plan was carried out. Despite this, the responses in regard to 
the delegation of tasks/authority and the coordination from the center varied. 
 
In Cianjur, the local government responded to the delegation of tasks and authority through 
its regional consultative council (muspida) meetings, which involved related agencies such as 
the army and police. These meetings were carried out systematically down to the kecamatan 
level. In Bima, Tapanuli Tengah, and Demak, the coordination control was in the hands of the 
social affairs agency who involved related agencies such as Bappeda, PT Pos, Statistics 
Indonesia, and all camat representatives. These agencies were invited to attend an event about 
the socialization of the technicalities of the program. In Kota Ternate, the coordination 
between levels took place down to the lurah level. The coordination was still limited to the 
program’s socialization activities between regions and between elite and did not spread nor 
was it intensive at the village apparatus level, with community leaders or with the community. 
The coordination also made no serious efforts to organize follow up or anticipate for the 
systematic monitoring and evaluation of the program implementation. The orientation of the 
coordination of the institutions seemed to be more focused on fulfilling formal requirements. 
 
While the implementation of BLT 2005 was dominated by Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos took 
the dominant role in the implementation of BLT 2008. In sample areas, the post office was 
involved in the socialization process, explanations about the verification of RTS data, distribution 
of fuel compensation cards (KKB) to the village/kelurahan level, fund disbursement and receiving 
community complaints. Other institutions/agencies were only involved in the socialization 
process, coordination between agencies and tended to wait for information from the post office. 
 
Generally, problems with the institutional aspects of the BLT program ranged from problems 
with coordination and consolidation between levels and institutions to the speed and ability to 
understand instructions from higher level institutions to those below. The weaknesses with 
the institutional coordination and consolidation between institutions and levels (kabupaten, 
kecamatan, and village) were caused by a number of factors, including unclear division of 
authority between agencies, delayed budget realization for the coordination meetings and the 
implementation of the BLT-RTS from the provincial to kabupaten levels, the complicated 
bureaucracy process, and the confusion over the actual objectives and characteristics of the 
BLT 2008 program. 
 
The formation of UPP BLT-RTS only occurred at the kabupaten/kota levels, and not at the 
kecamatan level as was instructed by the technical guidelines for the BLT 2008 program. In 
almost all sample regions, the formation of UPP was explained in decrees from the regional 
heads. However, in Bima, decrees about the formation of these units were signed by the head 
of the local social affairs agency. However, the decrees only included the structure of the technical 
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implementing unit for BLT 2008 and did not clearly detail the function and authority of the 
establishment, supervision, and monitoring of the program from the respective agencies involved.  
 
Due to the delayed budget realization, the coordination meetings, which should have taken 
place at the start of the program implementation, had to be held after the implementation of 
socialization for BLT 2008. In Bima, the UPP BLT-RTS was forced to limit its supervising 
and monitoring activities of the program implementation because the operational funds had 
not been received. In accordance with the regulations, these funds can only be released if all 
operational activity reports and staff travel directive reports have been signed and sent to the 
provincial government. Based on these reports, the provincial government could then disburse 
the operational funds. In Tapteng, monitoring and evaluation activities did not even take 
place. This was because the local social affairs agency had only been formed three months 
prior to the research being carried out (around May 2008), and because they had not yet 
received operational funds. 
 
Another problem involving institutions was the negative perceptions toward the program 
from some government apparatus from the kabupaten to the village level, NGOs, and the 
media. They felt that BLT made people lazy and consumptive. Thus, some stakeholders 
suggested that BLT should be replaced by a community empowerment program that the 
village needed. 
 
 
2.2 Socialization 
 
Socialization of the 2008 BLT program involved multiple institutions at the kabupaten/kota 
and kecamatan levels. Apart from Kota Ternate, socialization took place in the form of a 
coordination meeting involving the muspida and other related institutions such as the local 
government, Office of Social Affairs, Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos, Bappeda, BPM, and camat. 
The village heads/lurah and the kecamatan consultative council (muspika) were only involved in 
socialization at the kecamatan level. In Kota Ternate, the socialization for the 2008 BLT program 
was conducted separately before the coordination meeting and directly involved the lurah. 
 
The implementation of interinstitution socialization carried out at the kabupaten level was 
generally instigated by the Office of Information and Communications, the Office of Social 
Affairs and the post office. This differs from the implementation of the socialization for BLT 
2005 where Statistics Indonesia was the only organization that conducted socialization to the 
local government apparatus. As well as holding the coordination meeting, the Office of 
Information and Communications also conducted socialization through pamphlets, radio 
broadcasts, and press conferences. 
 
Socialization for the community was not done in any formal way. The RTS communities 
generally only got their information about BLT 2008 from village/kelurahan agencies. RTS 
obtained information about the plan for the disbursement of funds from the village apparatus, 
particularly from the head of the RT/RW when they went to collect their KKB. Non-RTS 
communities heard information by word of mouth, and also obtained information through 
local media news and articles, or through community service advertisements. In Cianjur and 
Demak socialization to the community was included in various routine local or kecamatan 
activities. In one village in Cianjur, socialization also took place through religious activities 
(pengajian9 and Friday sermons).  
                                                 
9Pengajian is a Koran reciting group.  
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In almost all sample regions, except for Kota Ternate, the socialization material for the 2008 
BLT program focused only on the technical implementation of the program, such as 
verification, distribution of the KKB, fund disbursement timetable, and the total amount of 
funds to be disbursed. Important explanations about what BLT actually is, the background 
and objectives of the program, and the criteria for BLT recipients were not given serious 
attention. Socialization of this kind of material is very important in order to minimize conflict 
and to increase the monitoring role of the community.  
 
The implementation of socialization for the 2008 BLT program was far better than that for 
the 2005 BLT program, especially with regards to the disbursement of funds. For the 2005 
BLT program there were weaknesses in the socialization of the technical aspects of the 
program at almost all stages, that is, data collection, fund disbursement, and complaint mechanisms. 
The increase in quality of 2008 BLT fund disbursement was influenced by the intensive 
socialization efforts from the media, post office, and village apparatus. Press about the date of 
the fund disbursement spread widely, not only through print and radio media, but also through 
copies of the disbursement timetable which the post office gave to the village apparatus. 
 
 
2.3  Verification and Accuracy of Targeting  
 
2.3.1  Verification Process 
 
In contrast with the targeting for BLT 2005, which was conducted by Statistics Indonesia 
using the 2005 poor household data collection process—known as 2005 the Socioeconomic 
Data Collection on the Population (PSE05)—the basis for determining beneficiaries of BLT 
2008 was through a verification process of the 2005/2006 RTS database, which had been 
updated in 1,000 kecamatan in relation to the Family of Hope Program (PKH).  
 
From all sample areas, only Bima and Tapteng had made use of the updated data from the 
2007 Health and Education Basic Services Survey to allocate the beneficiaries of BLT 2008. 
While other kabupaten/kota still used the same data as for BLT 2005–2006 (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Number of RTS in Five Sample Kabupaten/Kota  
Kabupaten/ 
Kota 
BLT 
2005/2006 
Updating related to 
PKH (SPDKP 2007) 
BLT 2008 
KKB received by 
RTS 
KKB cancelled/printing 
process 
Total % 
Tapanuli Tengah 35,861 34,900 34,780 120 0.3 
Cianjur 195,579 - 160,324 35,255 18.0 
Demak 119,000 - 117,439 1,561 1.3 
Bima 52,614 51,815 48,409 3,406 6.6 
Ternate 3,915 - 3,877 38 1.0 
 
Statistics Indonesia at the central level, as the owner of the database, sends data of the 
names and addresses of RTS to PT Pos to print KKB. The KKB were printed by PT Pos 
then sent along with a nominative RTS list to all post offices in Indonesia. The post office 
then gave this nominative list to the village/lurah head to be verified. In Cianjur, Bima and 
Ternate, the nominative list was immediately given by the KPRK to the village/lurah head. 
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In Demak and Tapteng the nominative list was given to the village/lurah head through the 
subdistrict post office branch. 
 
According to the technical guidelines for the 2008 BLT program, post office and village staff 
are required to conduct verification of 2005/2006 BLT beneficiary data from Statistics 
Indonesia through a village consultation process involving all community elements from the 
village/kelurahan. With the exception of Tapteng and Cianjur, the verification process was 
more often conducted by village/kelurahan apparatus without involving other elements of the 
community such as religious and community figures, RT/RW/dusun heads, and others, with 
the excuse that there was limited time, resources, and the potential for local conflict. In Bima 
and Demak, verification was conducted completely by the RT head, without involving other 
elements of the community. In Kota Ternate, the kelurahan checked the data only with internal 
kelurahan staff and did not involve the RT/RW heads or community figures. In Demak and 
Cianjur, as well as for the purposes of verification, consultation at the RT/RW level was also 
conducted to make agreements about the deduction of BLT funds. 
 
The technical guidelines for BLT 2008 assert that verification is done to check for RTS that 
have moved or died (without an heir) and for inclusion errors, and then to cancel or withhold 
these RTS’s KKB. Such KKBs are then transferred to other households that have the right or 
are eligible to receive BLT, provided that the number of the new beneficiaries does not exceed 
the number of beneficiaries cancelled. Despite this, there were still various irregularities in the 
verification process. In almost all sample areas the verification process was only aimed at BLT 
2005 beneficiaries who had died or moved. Except for Bima, verification of beneficiaries who 
were not actually eligible to receive BLT (inclusion error) was not carried out in order to avoid 
potential conflict or threats to government apparatus. In one village in Demak, RTS who had 
moved were not crossed off the list of beneficiaries and their money could still be obtained by 
the head of the RT who then divided this money evenly to non-BLT beneficiaries. This was 
done to avoid conflicts like those which occurred during the data collection of 2005. 
 
In Kota Ternate there was an agreement at the kota level not to change the names of 2005 
BLT beneficiaries. In Tapteng the same agreement was made at the provincial level. However, 
in practice the village staff did not always adhere to this agreement. In one village in Tapteng, 
the village apparatus transferred the KKB to new deserving beneficiaries by giving them 
certificates from the village so that the new beneficiaries could access their money from the 
post office.  
 
In conducting verification of beneficiaries who are ineligible or finding replacement 
households who have the right to receive BLT, the village/RT/dusun apparatus in some 
sample areas said that they used the 14 criteria that were used by Statistics Indonesia in the 
data collection for BLT 2005. In Kota Ternate, during the socialization phase Statistics 
Indonesia gave instructions to the heads of kelurahan about the 14 criteria to determine 
whether a household was eligible to receive BLT or not. In Demak, Statistics Indonesia 
instructed the village apparatus, who had met with Statistics Indonesia to ask about this issue, 
to keep using these 14 predetermined criteria.  
 
As well as using the 14 criteria, some sample areas also used local criteria to determine 
households that were not eligible or to find appropriate replacement households. In one 
village in Tapteng, replacement RTS consisted of poor widows, people with disabilities, or 
elderly people. In one RW in Cianjur, the criteria for supplement RTS was if they did not have 
a house and had two to three children. Meanwhile, in other RW the criteria used was that 
beneficiaries did not have their own houses, had lived in the local area for a long time, and did 
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not have a stable income. In one village in Demak, the RT head determined that citizens who 
owned land or rice fields, owned a motorcycle, or had houses with stone walls and tiled floors 
were not eligible to receive BLT. 
 
The limited time for the verification process, which was on average one to two weeks, was 
one of the obstacles in the process at the village/kelurahan level. In one village in Kabupaten 
Bima, the Village Consultative Body (BPD) apparatus joined with the replaced RTS residents 
and protested in front of the kecamatan post office against the verification results and 
demanded they still receive BLT. Staff from the kecamatan post office were forced to comply 
with their demands. Based on results of the verification, in Cianjur there were 35,255 RTS 
which would receive a new KKB, or approximately 18% of the total number of RTS. While in 
Bima, approximately 6.6% of the total number of RTS failed to receive a KKB. In Tapteng, 
Demak, and Kota Ternate, the number of RTS who failed to receive a KKB or their KKB 
was still in the printing process was lower, at 0.3%, 1.31% and 1% respectively (see Table 4). 
 
2.3.2  Accuracy of Targeting  
 
To analyze the accuracy of the targeting for the 2008 BLT program, both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches were used. Using a qualitative approach, based on observations by 
the SMERU team and answers from the majority of respondents, mistargeting still occurred 
during the implementation of the 2008 BLT program. The majority of respondents stated 
that there were poor households which did not receive BLT and conversely, some well-off 
households that received BLT 2008. This was also supported by the FGD with kabupaten 
and village elites who explained that one of the big problems in this program was with the 
targeting and there needed to be improvements in the data collection process. The use of 
2005/2006 data which had not been updated and still had doubts over its validity, in 
addition with the verification process which was invalid and tended to be affected by the 
subjectivity of the RT/RW or village/kelurahan apparatus, caused mistargeting (inclusion and 
exclusion errors) with BLT 2008. Moreover, policies from the provincial/kabupaten/kota 
level instructing the village/RW/RT level not to redirect or replace RTS who had moved, 
passed away, or increased their welfare, in order to avoid conflict, worsened the mistargeting 
in the 2008 BLT program. 
 
Using a quantitative approach, the SMERU team collected data from 2005 BLT beneficiary 
respondents from the previous SMERU BLT study, along with some new respondents who 
were also BLT beneficiaries, using the PSE05.RT questionnaire as used by Statistics Indonesia 
for BLT 2005. From a total of 96 respondents who were beneficiaries of BLT 2008, 
approximately 60% were beneficiary respondents from the BLT 2005 study, the remainder 
could not be found as they had moved or died, and were thus replaced by other respondents 
who fulfilled the same criteria. 
 
Using the same weighting system and values as that of the 2005 BLT program, for the 14 
poverty indicators gained from the PSE05.RT questionnaire, the scores of every 
household respondent were calculated and their level of eligibility for receiving the 2008 
BLT fund was measured. The final score gained by each household ranged from 0 to 1; 
the higher the respondent’s score, the poorer the respondent, and vice versa. Furthermore, 
to determine the eligibility of a BLT beneficiary household, a cut-off point of 0.2 for the 
household score was used. Thus, those who obtained a score of 0.2 or higher were 
determined to be poor households. 
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At the cut-off point of 0.2 (see Table 5) 98.9% of RTS were eligible to receive BLT 2008. This 
shows that the level of accuracy of the targeting was quite high for BLT 2008. However, as 
there was no verification process for BLT 2005/2006 data in some areas, this figure seems to 
be too high to depict the real accuracy level of targeting for BLT 2008 in sample areas.  
 
To obtain information on the accuracy of targeting that is closer to the condition in the 
field, a sensitivity analysis was conducted with the cut-off point being increased to 0.4 and 
0.6. The result was that the proportion of RTS who were eligible to receive BLT 2008 
experienced a decrease in line with the increased cut-off point. Thus it can be seen that the 
determination of the cut-off point in the targeting process is very important as with a higher 
cut-off point, the selected households are only those which are very poor, while those which 
are not eligible are eliminated. 
 
If compared with BLT 2005, the proportion of RTS eligible to receive BLT 2008 does not 
change at the 0.2 cut-off point. However, with a cut-off point of 0.4 and 0.6 there is a 
downward trend when compared to 2005. The decrease in the proportion of RTS eligible to 
receive BLT 2008 compared to those in 2005 at the cut-off points of 0.4 and 0.6 shows there 
has been an increase in welfare for some RTS in the time period of 2005–08. In other words, 
some of the beneficiaries who previously received BLT 2005 are no longer eligible to receive 
BLT. In addition, if all three cut-off points are compared, the biggest decrease in the 
proportion of RTS who are entitled to receive the BLT between 2005 and 2008 occurs at the 
cut-off point of 0.6. This shows that between 2005 and 2008, the biggest increase in welfare 
occurred with very poor RTS rather than with near-poor households. 
 
Based on the results of calculations per region, Kota Ternate has the lowest proportion of 
RTS who are suitable for receiving BLT 2008, whereas Bima has the highest proportion. The 
low proportion of RTS suitable to receive BLT in Ternate has a positive correlation with the 
low level of poverty in this area.10 Thus, as with the different weighting for each variable in 
each region, the cut-off point should also be different for each region. 
 
 
2.4  Channeling of Funds 
 
2.4.1  Distribution of KKB 
 
In order to disburse BLT, RTS received a KKB with the beneficiary’s identity on the card. 
The RTS data was prepared by the Central Statistics Indonesia who then sent the data to PT 
Pos Indonesia to print the KKB. The KKB printing by PT Pos Indonesia was divided into 
five stages for 434 kabupaten/kota. The period for printing the KKB was from 15 May until 16 
June 2008. From the five sample kabupaten/kota, only Kota Ternate was included in the 
second stage of the KKB printing, while the other four kabupaten/kota were included in the 
fifth stage (see Table 6). 
 
After printing, the KKB were immediately given to KPRK throughout Indonesia. For a 
number of kabupaten/kota which did not have a KPRK, the KKB were sent to a KPRK closest 
to that kabupaten/kota. For Tapteng and Demak, the KKB were sent to KPRK Sibolga and 
KPRK Semarang respectively. While in Cianjur, Bima, and Kota Ternate, the KKB were sent 
directly to the respective KPRK in each kabupaten/kota. 
 
                                                 
10The poverty level in Ternate is based on Statistics Indonesia’s calculations in 2007, which is 4.26%. 
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Table 5. Proportion of RTS Eligible to Receive BLT 
Region 
Cut-off points 
N 
0.2 0.4 0.6 
2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Tapteng 100 100 94.4 88.2 83.3 47 18 17 
Cianjur 100 100 95 79 95 68 20 19 
Demak 100 100 94.1 42.8 64.7 14.3 17 7 
Bima 100 100 100 100 88.8 80 18 25 
Ternate 95 95.4 90 63.6 50 9.1 20 22 
Total 98.9 98.9 94.6 80.0 76.3 48.9 93 90 
Respondent Panel 98.2 100 94.6 80.3 78.5 44.6 56 
 
 
Table 6. KKB Printing Schedule 
Stage Number of Kabupaten/Kota Total Data Received
KKB Printing Process 
Period Total Printed 
I 10 778,790 15–21 May 778,790 
II 26a 699,092 22–26 May 699,092 
III 98 3,348,166 27–31 May 3,348,166 
IV 139 5,534,246 1–5 June 5,534,246 
V 161b 8,657,764 6–16 June 8,657,764 
Total 434 19,018,058  19,018,058 
aKota Ternate was the only sample area included in the second stage of the KKB printing.  
bKabupaten Tapteng, Kabupaten Cianjur, Kabupaten Demak, and Kabupaten Bima were included in the fifth stage of the KKB 
printing. 
 
During the printing process of the KKB there were a number of misprints (of names and 
addresses). This was found particularly in Tapteng and Bima. In one village in Tapteng there 
was a case where one name was written on three of the KKB. 
 
In contrast with BLT 2005, the distribution of the KKB for BLT 2008 did not involve 
Statistics Indonesia at the kabupaten/kota level, but only involved KPRK and kecamatan/village 
apparatus. Generally, the channels for the distribution of the KKB to the RTS started from 
the direct delivery of the KKB by KPRK to village/lurah heads which took place in the post 
office or the kecamatan office with first signing an official report that the KKB had been 
received. After this, village/lurah heads or staff then gave the cards directly to the RTS or 
passed them to the RT/RW/dusun head, or they were collected directly by the RTS at the 
village/lurah office. 
 
In Tapteng, after the KKB was taken from the KPRK in Sibolga by the secondary post office, 
the post office contacted the village heads to collect the KKB. The village heads then gave the 
KKB to the kepala lorong (dusun heads) to be immediately distributed to the RTS houses. In one 
village, which only has one functioning kepala lorong, the village heads advised the RTS to 
collect their KKB from the village head’s house. Meanwhile in Demak, the Semarang KPRK 
sent its staff under the direction of the coordinating implementer to distribute the KKB in 
each kecamatan. The kecamatan then requested the village heads to collect the KKB, which were 
then given by the village head to the RT head to be given to each RTS. 
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In Cianjur, the post office gave the KKB to the village heads during a meeting at the 
kecamatan. The village heads then gave the KKB to the RT heads to be divided to RTS houses. 
In Bima and Kota Ternate, the KKB were given directly to the village heads by the local 
KPRK. In Bima, the KKB were then given to RT heads by the village heads to be given 
straight to RTS. Meanwhile in Kota Ternate, the KKB were given to RTS in a number of 
ways. Besides being distributed through the RT, some KKB were given directly to RTS by 
kelurahan staff or were collected by RTS straight from the kelurahan. In this case, the 
information that RTS must collect their KKB at the kelurahan was not always gained from 
kelurahan staff or the RT head. This information sometimes came from neighbors or other 
RTS who had already collected their KKB. To avoid social jealousy and conflict, in some areas 
the KKB were distributed secretly. Moreover, according to one respondent in Kota Ternate, 
when they collected their KKB at the kelurahan, the kelurahan staff requested that the KKB not 
be shown to anyone else because they were worried that those members of the community 
who did not receive BLT would become jealous.  
 
The delivery of the KKB from the KPRK to the village heads was very dependent on the 
speed of the verification process and the location of the village. In general, the delivery stage 
of the KKB to village heads began with the post office giving the verified RTS list, and then 
the post office gave out the KKB strictly based on this data. However, in Tapteng there were 
KKB that had been cancelled but were still with the village head and had not been given back 
to the post office. The distribution of the KKB was also influenced by the geographical nature 
of the village. If villages were far from the KPRK, the distribution of KKB sometimes 
occurred close to the time of the disbursement of BLT funds. In some regions, the KKB were 
distributed one or two days before the BLT funds were given out. Moreover, in Kota Ternate, 
RTS who lived in three islands (Batang Dua, Moti, and Hiri) only received their KKB at the 
time of fund disbursement. 
 
During the distribution of the KKB there was no levy/payment required from the RTS. In 
general, the distribution of the KKB to the RTS went smoothly. The post office declared that 
the KKB being received by the RTS must not be lost because the post office would not 
replace them. This stipulation led to one RT head in Demak to recall the KKB from RTS after 
the first stage of BLT disbursement so that the KKB would not be lost. However, some RTS 
objected to this as there was no guarantee that the RT head could replace the card if the RT 
head lost the card and this also created an opportunity for the deduction of BLT funds. 
 
The KKB distribution organizer in each kecamatan received an incentive which was channeled 
through the post office. This incentive was counted at Rp2,500 per KKB distributed, with a 
financial break down of: Rp250 for the camat, Rp500 for the village head/lurah, Rp750 for the 
RW and Rp1,000 for the RT, and; a 5% deduction for PPH Article 21. However, the 
knowledge about the KKB and its distribution differed among regions. This was due to 
unclear information about the program. In Bima, the village apparatus and the heads of the 
RT/RW did not know anything about the existence of a stipend for the distribution of the 
KKB. In Kota Ternate, only the lurah knew about the stipend but it had not yet been 
collected. In Tapteng, some people knew about the stipend but had not yet collected it. In 
Cianjur, only the village apparatus (village head and village secretary) knew about and had 
received the stipend, and it was not divided to the RT/RW heads. While in Demak, the 
stipend was divided down to the RT/RW heads based on the number of RTS or it was 
divided evenly. 
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2.4.2 Disbursement of Funds 
 
Since Kota Ternate was in the second stage of the printing schedule for the KKB, it was also 
the earliest sample region to receive the fund disbursement schedule in comparison with the 
four other sample kabupaten. However, 168 (4.5%) have not been disbursed. At the time the 
researchers were in the field, on average between 88,3% and 97,8% of the disbursement 
process in each sample region had been completed (see Tabel 7). 
 
Table 7. Schedule for BLT Disbursement and Number of KKB which Have 
Been/Have Not Yet Been Paid Out for BLT Funds in Each Sample Kabupaten/Kota 
Kabupaten/Kota Schedule for Disbursement    of BLT KKB Paid
a  KKB Not Yet Paida  
1. Kab. Tapanuli Tengah 11–29 July 2008 30,461 3,555 
2. Kab. Cianjur 17 July–23 August 2008  156,930 3,394 
3. Kab. Demak  14–24 July 2008  n.a. n.a. 
4. Kab. Bima  21–27 July 2008  46,081  2,328 
5. Kota Ternate  19–25 June 2008 3,709  168  
 aThe final amount at the time the researchers were in the field (23 August–6 September 2008). 
 
As with BLT 2005, the disbursement of funds for BLT 2008 was conducted by the post 
office. The process of distributing BLT 2008 funds was relatively better than the process in 
2005 because PT Pos carried out a number of improvements to guarantee the fluency of the 
distribution of the funds for BLT 2008, including increasing the number of points of 
distribution, the total number of counters available as well as the staff. As not all the kecamatan 
in the sample kabupaten/kota had secondary post offices, PT Pos increased the number of 
distribution points in distant locations. PT Pos applied a more proactive system especially for 
elderly and sick beneficiaries, as well as for those in remote areas. 
 
In Cianjur, PT Pos implemented a proactive system by increasing the number of distribution 
points in some villages that reported the number of sick/elderly people. The post office also 
provided specific counters for elderly, disabled, and sick beneficiaries. In Tapteng, in order to 
implement this proactive mechanism, PT Pos required an application letter from the village 
head as well as signatures from at least half the total RTS in that village. Using this procedure, 
PT Pos conducted fund distribution in a number of remote villages. In Demak and Bima, PT 
Pos increased the number of distribution points in local kecamatan offices for remote locations. 
While in Kota Ternate, fund distribution in three islands was facilitated and funded by the 
local government using hired speedboats. 
 
Although PT Pos introduced the proactive system in some regions, some community members 
did not know about this system before the distribution, thus although PT Pos had already 
increased the number of distribution points, some of the RTS felt the distribution points were 
still too far away. The transportation cost to collect the funds generally ranged between 
Rp5,000–Rp25,000 for a return trip. In Cianjur the transportation cost for elderly RTS could 
reach up to Rp40,000 because they have to pay for someone to accompany them as well. 
 
During the disbursement of BLT, the post office provided large sun shelters, seats, drinks, and 
public-address system to ensure that the process is smooth and convenient for the people 
queuing to get the fund. In some regions, the post office extended their service hours during 
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BLT disbursement. In Cianjur and Demak the post office opened from 6am to 5pm. Post 
offices also conducted scheduling (day and hour) based on each village/kelurahan and 
introduced a number system for queuing or organized the flow of the beneficiaries queuing to 
anticipate them arriving altogether and jostling with each other on the first day. Generally, 
post offices were available for one week for fund disbursement. The RTS who wanted to 
collect their BLT funds outside of the set available times had to collect them from the KPRK 
or kabupaten secondary post office. Different from BLT 2005, the final date to receive BLT 
2008 funds was set for 31 December 2008. However, information about this final date for 
funds disbursement was not widely known by the RTS. Generally, the RTS only knew that the 
fund disbursement is carried out in one day, the day which is set on village/kelurahan schedule. 
 
Information about the time of fund disbursement was given to the RTS in various ways. In 
Tapteng, Cianjur, Demak and Bima, the village apparatus gave the information about the time 
of the fund distribution when handing out the KKB or when they went to the RTS’s houses. 
In one kecamatan in Cianjur the time for fund disbursement was brought forward but this was 
only announced a few hours before the disbursement took place. This occurred because the 
fund disbursement process in other villages was faster than the scheduled time. 
 
In Kota Ternate, information about the fund disbursement time was conveyed in a number of 
ways. In one kelurahan the information about the fund disbursement schedule was announced 
through megaphones from mosques/musholla (a place for Muslims to pray). Information about 
the disbursement schedule was also given through announcements on the radio and posted at 
post offices. 
 
To guarantee safety during the disbursement, PT Pos requested the security apparatus (police, 
army, public order agency (Satpol PP)) to ensure security during the process. In one kecamatan 
in Cianjur, the security apparatus were involved in helping PT Pos during the disbursement 
process by checking the RTS’s KKB before giving them to the post office staff. In Tapteng, 
the security apparatus’ authority was abused in the name of assisting RTS who wanted to save 
time and jump the queue or who claimed to be too old to wait for their turn. For this 
“service”, every RTS paid Rp10,000–Rp15,000. 
 
Based on the technical guidelines for the distribution of BLT to the RTS, BLT disbursement 
requires a KKB and valid proof of identity such as a KTP (identification card), driver’s license, 
family card, official letter from the kelurahan, etc. However, there were variations and 
deviations from this in the actual implementation. In Cianjur, to avoid delays in the first stage 
of disbursement, with the help of the apparatus, inheritors/new beneficiaries falsified KTPs 
from previous beneficiaries by replacing the photo with the photo of the inheritor/new 
beneficiary. There were also RTS who created a new KTP and changed the name to be the 
same as the name on the KKB. In Tapteng and Bima, PT Pos disbursed BLT funds to 
new/inheritor RTS without replacing the KKB. In Demak, the KKB of the RTS who had 
moved away were still being used by the RT/RW to receive funds, which were then divided 
equally among nonbeneficiaries. In Bima, not only the KKB from the RTS who had moved 
away but also from those who had died could be used by the village apparatus to gain funds 
which were then divided equally among poor nonbeneficiary households. 
 
In some areas funds could be received without having to show proof of identity (KTP, family 
card, driver’s license, official letter from the village/lurah). In Kota Ternate, instead of proof 
of identity, a 2005 KKB or guarantee from the lurah/RT present during the fund 
disbursement could be used. Generally, BLT funds were collected directly by the beneficiary 
whose name was written on the KKB. BLT disbursement for the RTS being represented by 
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someone else, due to ill health or old age, or the heir from an RTS, had to give proof of 
identity and the KKB, as well as an official letter from the village/lurah head. In actual 
implementation, this requirement varied between different regions.  
 
In general, the RTS received the complete funds of Rp300,000 from the post office, with 
the exception of one kecamatan in Tapteng. The post office staff deliberately made available 
particular denominations of money (Rp5,000, Rp10,000, Rp20,000, Rp50,000, and 
Rp100,000) so that it was easier for post office staff to obtain unofficial levies of Rp5000-
Rp10,000 per RTS. 
 
 
2.5 Complaints and Solving Problems  
 
As there was no specific BLT 2008 Complaint Handling Unit formed in each sample region 
there was no clear mechanism for complaints to be handled in the community. In Demak and 
Cianjur, respondents at the kabupaten level thought that complaints were dealt with by the 
PKPS BBM (Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program) Monitoring and Complaints 
Coordination which had been set up in 2005 in accordance with the Minister of Home Affairs 
Declaration Number 541/2338/SJ, on 13 September 2005. This team was under the Village 
Community Empowerment Body (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa, BPMD) or 
Community Empowerment Office (Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, Kapermas). In 
practice, in each sample region complaints were given directly to the various institutions 
involved (Statistics Indonesia, PT Pos, Office of Social Affairs, Regional Supervision Board 
(Bawasda)). Respondents at the village/kelurahan level generally made complaints to the 
village/kelurahan apparatus and to the RT/RW/dusun/lorong heads. In Demak, the local 
government opened a hotline, which could receive complaints by SMS (short message 
service); however, up to the time this research was conducted, there were no complaints 
received in this way for the implementation of BLT 2008. 
 
Generally, the complaints that were received were to do with data collection problems such as 
lack of clarity about the criteria for beneficiaries, targeting, and the number of beneficiaries. 
Responses to these complaints were generally the explanation that the RTS list still refers to 
the 2005/2006 data that was determined from the central government. In Demak the 
complaints were generally about mistargeting with people asking why they did not receive 
BLT, while other more well-off households did receive BLT. The complaints received were 
generally not dealt with and there was no follow up. 
 
In Bima, all aspects involved in the management of the program such as social affairs agency, 
the post office, Statistics Indonesia, Bappeda, kecamatan and village/kelurahan, stated that they 
received various complaints from the community. Statistics Indonesia in fact received on 
average two complaints per day. There were complaints related to suspicion that village and 
kelurahan apparatus kept some KKB and there were also complaints from some households 
who were beneficiaries of BLT 2005 but no longer received BLT in 2008. As there was no 
Complaint Handling Unit, responses to each complaint tended to be unclear and confusing. 
Generally, answers varied, including “don’t know”, “ask at the post office”, “regulation from 
the center”, and so on.  
 
In one village in Tapteng, the village head received complaints about inappropriate uses of 
BLT funds, which were being used to buy alcohol, gamble, and play billiards. The village head 
responded by going to the places involved and warning the accused RTS. In Kota Ternate, 
complaints received by the institutions involved were generally questions about the technical 
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implementation of BLT such as the requirements for fund disbursement when the beneficiary 
could not be represented. There were also complaints related to the targeting of BLT, such as 
why some people were not receiving BLT 2008 when they previously received BLT 2005. 
These complaints were answered by explaining that the data received came from the central 
government and could not be changed.11 
 
In a number of sample regions there was an agreement between residents to deduct some of 
the BLT funds to be divided evenly among residents who did not receive BLT. The 
community considered this to be an appropriate way to ensure harmony between residents. In 
Cianjur, a similar agreement was made, which was considered a good way of pacifying 
potential conflict and reduce complaints from the community. This shows the lack of concern 
from the apparatus in dealing with problems, as they went along with the demands of non-
BLT beneficiaries in the community. 
 
 
2.6  Satisfaction Levels  
 
2.6.1  Village/Kabupaten Elite Satisfaction Levels  
 
The elite’s satisfaction levels with the implementation of BLT were measured through FGDs 
at the kabupaten and village levels. In each sample kabupaten/kota one FGD was conducted for 
the kabupaten elite and one FGD was conducted for the village elite. Results from the five 
FGDs at the kabupaten level and the ten FGDs with the village elite show that the satisfaction 
level for the kabupaten elite is higher than that for the village elite, except for the KKB card 
distribution stage. This was the same case as with the implementation of BLT 2005. The 
negative impact was felt more by the village elite than the kabupaten elite in relation to each 
problem during the implementation of BLT—for example being the target of contempt of 
nonbeneficeries—causing the satisfaction level at the village elite level to be lower than that 
for the elite at the kabupaten level (see Graphic 1). As with BLT 2005, both the village and 
kabupaten elite rated the KKB card and BLT fund distribution stages as the stages with the 
highest satisfaction level. The reason for this high satisfaction level was the security and 
fluency of the implementation process at these two stages. 
 
There was a significant difference between the satisfaction levels of the kabupaten and village 
elites at the targeting and socialization stages. Differing from BLT 2005, in BLT 2008 the 
targeting was the least satisfactory level for the village elite and the socialization of the 
program was the least satisfactory level for the kabupaten elite. In BLT 2005, socialization was 
the least satisfactory level for both the village and kabupaten elite. The low level of satisfaction 
of the village elite at the targeting stage of BLT 2008 is due to the fact that the village elite are 
the people who are most impacted by mistakes with targeting, whereas the kabupaten elite were 
not satisfied with the socialization stage of the program because according to them 
socialization at the community level was insufficient. 
 
                                                 
11In Ternate, one person received BLT in 2005 but did not receive BLT in 2008 because their name was not on 
the list received by the post office. Accompanied by kelurahan staff, this person reported to the post office and 
the post office told the person to report to Statistics Indonesia. According to Statistics Indonesia the data came 
from Jakarta and could not be changed. 
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Graphic 1. Satisfaction levels of the village and kabupaten/kota elites in five sample 
kabupaten/kota 
 
Graphic 2. RTS Satisfaction Levels in Five Sample Kabupaten/Kota 
 
 
2.6.2  Recipient Satisfaction Levels  
 
The satisfaction levels of the RTS with the implementation of BLT were measured during 
RTS FGDs at the village level. In each sample kabupaten/kota there were four RTS FGDs 
carried out; two female and two male FGD groups. The results of the ten FGDs with women 
and men showed that there was no significant difference between the male and female 
satisfaction level with the implementation of BLT. However, there was a tendency that the 
satisfaction level of men towards some stages of BLT implementation (handling of problems, 
program socialization, and card distribution) was higher than that for women. On the other 
hand, the female group had relatively higher levels of satisfaction with the total funding 
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amount and the accuracy of targeting. Meanwhile, both the male and female groups had 
almost the same level of satisfaction toward the involvement of institutions and fund 
disbursement (see Graphic 2). 
 
As at the elite levels, the distribution of KKB cards and the disbursement of funds were 
considered the most satisfactory stages for the RTS particularly because of the fluency of the 
process. This was similar to the implementation of BLT 2005. They assessed that there were 
no meaningful obstacles in these two stages of the implementation, and that some of the RTS 
received KKB directly to their houses, delivered by the village apparatus or the RT head. This 
was also the case with the disbursement of funds, which took place faster and safer than with 
the disbursement of BLT in 2005. However, the accuracy of targeting and the total amount of 
funds were the issues RTS considered least satisfactory. The dissatisfaction was caused by the 
large amount of poor households who did not receive BLT and that some well-off households 
did receive BLT. The low level of satisfaction with the amount of funds was due to the 
amount being considered insufficient, and this was worsened by the deductions of funds.  
 
The RTS had quite high satisfaction levels with regards to the handling of problems because 
there were few conflicts with the implementation of BLT 2008. Compared to conflicts with 
BLT 2005, which included protests and threats to the village apparatus and destruction of 
public facilities; BLT 2008 was relatively far safer. Differing from BLT 2005, the RTS 
satisfaction toward the socialization of BLT 2008 was quite high. Although socialization of the 
program was not optimal, the RTS were quite satisfied and considered the information they 
received to be appropriate for what they needed to know; information related to the 
disbursement process such as the schedule, requirements and rules for disbursement. With the 
implementation of BLT 2005, socialization was the least satisfactory stage for BLT 
beneficiaries. 
 
In relation to the assessment of institutional aspects, the FGD participants generally found it 
hard to understand or define and identify the institutions involved in implementing BLT. They 
also did not know about the various roles of institutions above the village/kelurahan level, 
except for the post office. Thus, the RTS satisfaction level assessment on the achievement of 
the institutions was limited to the implementing institutions at the village/kelurahan level and 
the post office. 
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III. COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE STIGMA 
SURROUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BLT 
 
 
3.1 Is BLT Incapable of Dealing with the Shocks Caused by the 
Increase in the Fuel Price? 
 
Generally RTS stated that the funds they received were enough to help reduce the economic 
burden on the household. However, they felt that the amount of funds was insufficient. 
This is because they only compared the BLT funds received with nominal prices for various 
needs, such as rice and low-octane fuel (gasoline), which indicated that the value of the 2008 
BLT was lower than that of the 2005 BLT. If we refer to the objective of BLT to give 
compensation as a result of the fuel price rise, which is always followed by price rises for 
other goods, the value of BLT should be compared with the increases in price of these 
goods. As seen in Table 8, if compared with changes in the average price of rice and low-
octane fuel between the month before and the month after the fuel price rise, the 2008 BLT 
funds actually increased. However, the community did not notice this. The community 
assessment that the value of BLT decreased was due to the increasingly large deductions that 
affected the RTS. 
 
Tabel 8. Comparison of the Value of BLT with Changes in the Price of Rice and 
Low-octane Fuela 
One Month Before and 
One Month After the 
Fuel Price Increase 
Nominal Price 
(Rp) 
Price Changes between 
the Months 
Comparison of the 
Value of BLTb with 
Changes in Prices 
1.  Rice (Kg)    
September 2005 3,460 
212 472 
October 2005 3,672 
May 2008 5,332 
185 541 
June 2008 5,517 
2.  Low-octane fuel (liter)   
September 2005 2,400 
2,100 48 
October 2005 4,500 
May 2008 4,500 
1,500 67 
June 2008 6,000 
Source: State Logistics Board (Bulog) and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2009. 
aChanges in fuel prices which led to the 2005 BLT and 2008 BLT programs took place on 1 October 2005 and 24 May 2008. 
bValue of BLT = Rp100.000/month. 
 
The received BLT funds were generally spent straight away and used up within less than one 
week, although the use of the funds could last longer than a week. Generally, the RTS used 
BLT funds to fulfill their most urgent needs. In some regions, during the disbursement of 
BLT there was an appeal from the PT Pos staff concerning the use of funds given to the 
RTS. The PT Pos staff generally recommended that the funds be used to buy basic 
necessities. In Tapteng this appeal was also made by the village apparatus in drinking places 
where citizens often meet together, requesting they do not use the money to buy alcohol or 
gamble. Despite this, the RTS made the decisions completely by themselves concerning the 
use of the BLT funds.   
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Although the funds were distributed to the household head (husband), the majority of the 
BLT funds were managed by wives. There were no changes in consumption patterns, and 
even if they were, they only lasted for a few days after BLT was disbursed. In terms of funds 
management, the majority of the RTS used the BLT funds for consumption with an average 
proportion of approximately 45% (see Appendix 2). The RTS prioritized the availability of 
basic goods, especially rice, to fulfill daily needs over a relatively long period of time. In terms 
of other uses aside from food, each region had different priorities. In Tapteng, aside from 
being used for transportation costs, the majority of the RTS used BLT funds received to treat 
an illness or for household improvements. The proportion of usage for treating an illness on 
average reached 87%, whereas for household improvements 89.2% on average was used and 
this was the biggest expenditure in Tapteng. 
 
In Cianjur and Bima there was a tendency for the RTS to be more willing to go into debt 
relying on the BLT funds which they were to receive. Thus the use of BLT funds to pay off 
debts was the biggest expenditure in Bima and the second biggest in Cianjur after 
consumption. Moreover, in Bima many RTS went into debt with kiosk owners charging 
interest of 50%–100%, depending on the length of the loan, which was usually between one 
and three months. Aside from paying off debts, the majority of the RTS in Cianjur used BLT 
funds for transportation costs at an average of 5.2% whereas in Bima funds were used for 
school costs and to buy clothes, with average proportions of 20.3% and 19.9% of BLT funds 
respectively.  
 
In Ternate, the majority of the RTS used BLT funds for transportation costs, business capital 
and school costs. On average 12.8% of BLT funds were used for transportation and 46.2% 
for business capital. Meanwhile funds used for school costs reached 83.3% and was on 
average the biggest expenditure in Ternate. This also occurred in Demak, where the majority 
of the RTS used their BLT funds for school costs at an average expenditure of 20.8%. 
 
Other uses of BLT funds included paying for electricity, making a KTP, and paying for zakat 
(tithes), cigarettes, mobile phone credit, and so on. Although it was relatively infrequent, there 
were cases of BLT funds being used for non-urgent needs, such as buying  mobile phones, 
phone credit, DVD player, VCDs, and playing billiards, and even for activities such as 
gambling and buying alcohol. 
 
If compared with the results of the BLT 2005 study (Hastuti et al., 2006), there are differences in 
the priorities of the use of BLT funds in 2008. The differences in priorities were related to the 
schedule for disbursement of BLT funds. The majority of respondents used BLT 2005 for 
consumption, paying off debts, buying clothes and business capital. Whereas in 2008, BLT 
funds, aside from being used for consumption needs and to pay off debts, a significant amount 
was used for transportation and school costs. Due to the first stage of disbursement for BLT 
2005 occurring close to Eid al-Fitr (the celebration at the end of Ramadhan), the majority of 
beneficiaries used the funds to buy clothes. In contrast with BLT 2005, in some sample regions 
the distribution schedule for BLT 2008 stage 1 was in July–August, which was the time for the 
new school year, and so many RTS used the BLT funds for paying school costs. 
 
 
3.2  Is the Targeting of BLT Inaccurate? 
 
The targeted households for BLT 2008 was not determined based on new census data but on 
the results of the verification of BLT 2005/2006 beneficiaries. However, generally the 
community did not know that verification of the 2005/2006 BLT data had been conducted. 
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This was because the community was not involved in the verification process for determining 
the RTS for BLT 2008. The community thought that the data for BLT 2008 respondents was 
exactly the same as that for 2005/2006 BLT respondents. Thus, when mistargeting and 
undercoverage occurred with BLT 2008, the community immediately related it to the various 
problems experienced with the 2005 data collection. 
 
In relation to the data collection in 2005 and also the results of the verification in 2008, the 
majority of informants at the community level believed there were still many poor households 
which should have been receiving BLT but did not receive it. On the other hand, there were 
households who were relatively well-off who received BLT. Generally, the number of well-off 
households who were considered RTS was smaller than the number of poor households who 
did not receive BLT. 
 
Based on FGD and in-depth interview results with the RTS and village elite as well as in-depth 
interview results with nonbeneficiary households, the causes of mistargeting included: 
inappropriate criteria for selecting poor households, data collection mechanisms which were 
not comprehensive (because there was a quota) and not in line with regulations (nepotism), 
and there was doubt about the integrity of the data collectors and the community from whom 
data was taken. According to the community, the inaccurate criteria used by the government 
to determine poor households that would become the RTS was one of the causes of the 
mistargeting of BLT. Although the community did not completely understand the criteria used 
by the government, they considered the criteria to be inaccurate because there were still many 
poor households that were not counted as RTS. 
 
To gain further knowledge of the community’s understanding of poverty and the related 
criteria, SMERU conducted household welfare classification FGDs. The aim of these FGDs 
was to understand how the community differentiates between social groups based on living 
standards using criteria that they formulate themselves. The results of these FGDs showed 
that most of the community differentiated between social groups according to four categories: 
“rich”, “medium”, “poor”, “very poor”. In one village in Bima there was an extra category 
(“very rich”) in the welfare classification. 
 
Although there are similarities in the divisions of the social groups between regions, there 
were differences with the criteria of each group in each sample area. The criteria for a poor 
family in Kota Ternate differed from the criteria for a poor family in Demak. The same 
occurred with criteria for the “very rich”, “rich”, “medium”, “poor” and “very poor” groups. 
Moreover, within the same kabupaten/kota there were differences between villages (see 
Appendix 1). Generally the criteria used referred to the ownership of assets and valuable 
goods (land, rice fields, houses, furniture, livestock, gold, savings), transportation vehicle, job, 
education, income, and life style. For criteria which were the same between groups, such as 
land ownership, rich, average and poor families were differentiated based on the size of the 
land they own. Thus, people who owned an extensive amount of land were considered richer, 
and this was also the case for other criteria. 
 
Besides the social grouping criteria, each region also had local criteria. In Cianjur and Kota 
Ternate, the community used various criteria to determine living standards such as whether 
people had already been on the haj. In Bima one criterion was about involvement in various 
social activities such as weddings, syukuran (a ceremony to express gratefulness to God), and 
so on. Another local criterion in Bima was the number of pillars of a house. If a house had 
less than six pillars the household was considered poor, whereas if there were more than six, 
the household was considered average or wealthy. 
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There are differences between the number of poor households according to Statistics 
Indonesia data and FGD results because the FGD results refer to the community’s 
perceptions of poverty.12 The proportion of poor households according to welfare 
classification FGDs is always larger than the proportion of RTS (see Table 9). The proportion 
of poor families based on the FGD results is between 17%–90%, while the total number of 
RTS compared with the total number of families in each village is between 10%–68%. In 
other words, there are still many families who are considered poor according to community 
criteria but do not receive BLT.  
 
Table 9. Proportion of RTS and Poor Families in Sample Villages 
Kabupaten/Kota Kecamatan Village Proportion of RTSa (%) 
Estimated Number of  
Poor Familiesb (%) 
1. Tapteng 
Sibabangun Mombang Boru 48 64 
Sorkam  Pearaja 68 90 
2. Cianjur 
Cugenang  Cibulakan 26 63 
Cibeber  Girimulya 37 33 
3. Demak 
Wedung  Berahan Wetan 33 74 
Karang Tengah  Wonoagung 40 81 
4. Bima 
Monta Simpasai 38 68 
Wera Nunggi 39 78 
5. Ternate 
Ternate Tengah Kampung Pisang 10 17 
Ternate Selatan Fitu 24 62 
aThe number of RTS in proportion to the number of households in each sample village.  
bResults of the welfare classification of households FGD. 
To gain a better understanding about the community’s perspective of mistargeting and 
undercoverage, SMERU, along with the community, carried out verification of RTS and poor 
families in one dusun or one RW based on the criteria for poverty as formulated by the 
community. The selection of one dusun or one RW, aside from being based on considerations 
concerning limited time and personnel, was also based on judgments about the limited 
capacity of FGD participants in knowing about all households in their area and their lifestyles. 
 
According to the results of the verification, mistargeting and undercoverage for the BLT 
program occurred in almost all villages/kelurahan. This situation is possible due to the 
different approaches used in data collection by PSE 05 and FGD data. The PSE 05 was an 
objective measure of poverty, while the FGD data results are more a subjective measure of 
poverty. Only in one village in Tapteng was there no mistargeting, while in other areas 
mistargeting ranged from 3% to 80%. Undercoverage also occurred from 9% to 78%  
(see Table 10) 
 
                                                 
12Comparisons between the number of RTS and the proportion of poor household heads, as shown in the table 
mentioned, are not entirely accurate due to a number of reasons. The first reason is that the number of poor 
household heads according to the community is only an estimate based on their observation in the village. 
Secondly, the number of RTS is determined based on the household unit, while the estimate of poor families, 
and the data results in various villages, is based on the concept of the family, where within one household there 
can be more than one family. 
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Table 10. Proportion of Poor Households in Sample RW/Dusuna 
Kabupaten/ 
Kota Kecamatan Village 
Proportion of  
Non-poor RTS in 
One RW/Dusun 
(Mistargeting) (%) 
Proportion of 
Non-RTS Poor 
Households 
(%) 
1. Tapteng 
Sibabangun Mombang Boru 4 9 
Sorkam  Pearaja 0 n.a. 
2. Cianjur 
Cugenang  Cibulakan 12b 52b 
Cibeber  Girimulya 40 63 
3. Demak 
Wedung  Berahan Wetan 8 15 
Karang Tengah  Wonoagung 3 15 
4. Bima 
Monta Simpasai 80 71 
Wera Nunggi 23 57 
5. Ternate 
Ternate Tengah Kampung Pisang 20 64 
Ternate Selatan Fitu 16 78 
aProcessed from data results from the FGDs on welfare classification. 
bRTS data is only for three RT, that is RT 2, 3, and 4. 
 
According to the community in one village in Tapteng, there was no mistargeting of funds  
because they formulated a relatively high poverty criteria (see Appendix 2). In this village, 
households with land ownership and having electricity were included as part of the criteria for 
being poor. The community also determined a high standard income per month, at Rp1,000,000 
per month. The high standards in the poverty criteria in this village meant that the number of 
poor families, according to the community’s perceptions, was inflated, reaching 90% of the 
total households in the village. Thus, from 166 RTS, not one was considered to be non-poor. 
 
The high rate of mistargeting and undercoverage in one village in Bima was caused by 
inaccurate 2005 BLT data. Incorrect data collection mechanisms and nepotism in determining 
RTS caused conflict which culminated in the forced closure of the village office during the 
implementation of BLT 2005. During BLT 2008, based on the results of the verification by 
SMERU and the community, there was overcoverage in two dusun in the same village because 
the number of RTS in these two dusun (318) was more than the total number of poor 
households (220). From these 318 RTS, according to the community only 63 of these households 
were actually poor, whereas the remaining 255 RTS were not poor families. The large number 
of poor families in these two dusun, as well as the large number of mistargeted RTS caused a high 
level of undercoverage in these two dusun. In Cianjur and Ternate, the high undercoverage 
levels were caused by mistargeting but also by insufficient RTS allocations for these regions. 
 
Aside from RTS selection criteria, other causes of mistargeting in BLT 2008, according to the 
community, were data collecting mechanisms from BLT 2005 which were not comprehensive 
and not in line with regulations. Only certain poor people were included in the 2005 data 
collection process, based on the initial data available or on information from people 
considered to understand the conditions in the village. Data collectors did not always visit the 
house of each poor family. 
 
Some informants also felt the data collectors lacked integrity during the 2005 data collection 
process. The lack of integrity among data collectors was shown when many people close to 
the data collector, including the data collectors themselves, became BLT beneficiaries, even 
though there were many poorer households. Some informants also queried the honesty of the 
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community who were questioned for the data collection. Not all those questioned gave 
accurate information about their living conditions. The results of the data collection were also 
never reconfirmed with the community thus they could not conduct a cross-check. According 
to the community not having this cross-check had an influence on the mistargeting. 
 
 
3.3 Does BLT Create Opportunities for Corruption? 
 
All RTS knew that they should receive Rp300,000 for three months for their 2008 BLT funds, 
although in reality the RTS did not always receive the total amount. From the five sample 
kabupaten/kota, with the total number of respondents between 6 and 25 RTS per region, only 
in Ternate did all respondents receive the complete amount of BLT funds (see Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Percentage of Total Deductions and RTS Respondents Receiving 
Reduced BLT Funds in Five Sample Kabupaten/Kota 
Kabupaten/Kota Total Number of Respondents 
RTS Receiving 
Reduced BLT 
Funds (%) 
Range of 
Deductions (%) 
Average 
Deduction (%) 
1. Tapteng 18 22 1–3 1.5 
2. Cianjur 22 91 16–55 32.2 
3. Demak 6 100 33–50 41.3 
4. Bima 25 48 3–6 3.7 
5. Ternate 19 0 0 0 
Total 90 46.67 1–55 22.4 
 
With these deductions, the size of funds actually received by the RTS differed between 
research areas, ranging from Rp135,000–Rp300,000. The largest BLT deductions occurred in 
Cianjur and Demak. On average, the RTS in Cianjur only received 67.8% of total BLT funds 
and those in Demak only received 58.7% of the funds. 
 
The BLT 2008 funds were deducted at two points, at the post office and at the community 
level, using various methods. In Tapteng, deductions at the post office only took place in one 
post office, with Rp5,000–Rp10,000 being deducted. According to the community, this 
deduction was a way of saying thank you to post office personnel for their service and the 
actual amount was up to the beneficiary. However, there were other factors that influenced 
beneficiaries to give away a portion of their fund. Some respondents stated that post office 
workers deliberately provided small denominations of money—Rp100,000, Rp50,000, 
Rp20,000, Rp10,000, and Rp5,000 notes—so that it was easier for them to take these 
unofficial levies of Rp5,000–Rp10,000/RTS.  For BLT 2005, some beneficiaries stated that 
they were used to giving money, on average Rp5,000, to the post office workers as a way of 
saying “thank you”. While not all beneficiaries were willing to give money, all BLT 2005 
beneficiaries, however, were required to pay Rp10,000 per person to buy a lottery prize 
coupon, which was circulated by the post office staff, in relation to the World Cup event. 
 
Deductions at the community level by the RT/RW/dusun head took place in Cianjur, Demak, 
and Bima with the amount deducted ranging from Rp10,000 to Rp165,000. The majority of 
deductions were the result of agreements at the village level with the size of the deduction 
being fully determined by discussions at the RT/RW/dusun level with community leaders and 
RTS. Following are a number of cases which appeared related to agreements that were made: 
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a) In one dusun in Demak, the RTS who refused the decision made at the RT level to deduct 
BLT funds received some threats, including that they would not receive their KKB, that 
they would not get Raskin, and would be excluded from community activities. In 
practice, these threats were not carried out but were used as a scare tactic. 
b) In Cianjur and Demak, the agreement about the deduction of funds was confirmed in 
writing with a declaration letter that affirmed the willingness of every RTS to give a 
portion of their BLT fund. The village apparatus set out the format of the letter. This 
was done to avoid accusations from the authorities to the village apparatus and 
RT/RW/dusun heads. 
 
In Cianjur and Demak, deductions from BLT funds were carried out with the reason being to 
avoid conflict with nonbeneficiary parts of the community who also wanted to receive BLT 
funds. Deductions for this reason have been taking place since the distribution of BLT 2005 
and are considered an effective mechanism for dealing with conflict. As there was no 
determent/banning from the local government these deductions continued to take place and 
the total amount increased with BLT 2008, both in terms of the sum of deduction and the 
number of cases of deduction. The funds deducted are then distributed to households who 
did not receive BLT. There were differences between regions in the mechanism for this 
division of funds and the amount of funds for BLT 2008, as explained below: 
a) Funds equally divided to all households who did not receive BLT, without considering 
welfare level. This method was found in a number of RT/RW/dusun in Demak and 
Cianjur. In Demak the amount of funds received by nonbeneficiaries was between 
Rp100,000 and Rp125,000 while in Cianjur it ranged from Rp20,000 to Rp50,000. 
b) Funds divided to all households who did not receive BLT, with the size of the funds being 
dependent on the welfare level of a household. This method was also found in Demak and 
Cianjur with the amount of funds ranging from Rp20,000–Rp80,000 per nonbeneficiary 
household. 
 
Another reason for BLT 2008 deductions was to help pay for various community activities, 
such as Independence Day celebrations in August, road infrastructure development, religious 
activities such as musabaqah tilawatil Qur’an (competition for reciting the Koran), and even as 
incentives for the village administration apparatus. The deductions for these reasons are on 
average smaller than those for the reasons outlined above. In relation to the use of the funds, 
some communities could not guarantee that the funds from the deductions were definitely 
used for these reasons, because there was a lack of transparency in the management of the 
funds, thus making it very vulnerable to corruption. 
 
There were no deductions in Ternate, which was perhaps due to the fact that the community 
considered the amount of BLT funds to be quite small compared to the high living cost. BLT 
fund of Rp100,000 per month was considered insufficient and one BLT beneficiary even stated 
that the money would be used up within one day to shop in the market and fulfill other needs. 
Demands for the funds were considered unsuitable for the amount of funds received. Also, the 
poor communities in Ternate generally have plantation land,13 or are fishers and so can still work 
for their daily needs. They only sell to the market if they have an excess of goods. 
                                                 
13In Kota Ternate, communities in the poor category are relatively better-off compared to those that are 
considered poor in other regions. 
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3.4 Does BLT Cause Conflict?  
 
The implementation of BLT 2008 ran much more smoothly than the implementation of BLT 
2005. Five research target villages were selected because they experienced conflict related to 
BLT 2005; only one of these villages, in Bima, still had occurrences of conflict. This conflict 
was a consequence of the verification results submission from the village apparatus, which 
determined that 55 of the RTS from BLT 2005 in that village were not eligible to receive BLT 
2008. The family members of these 55 RTS, led by a member of the BPD, protested in front 
of the post office and demanded the post office give them their KKB. Worried that the 
demonstration could become anarchic, the post office finally revoked the village verification 
results and returned the KKB of these 55 RTS. 
 
The majority of conflict was only tension between non-RTS and RTS citizens and also with 
the government apparatus. This tension was usually caused by cynical comments from non-
RTS to RTS and by accusations of nepotism and injustice within the village apparatus in terms 
of accurate targeting of BLT recipients. These cynical comments and accusations of nepotism 
usually came from citizens who felt they were poorer than the RTS but did not receive BLT. 
For example, one nonbeneficiary informant in Bima stated, “Well fine then, if there are any 
government programs, they [RTS] can do the work”14. For this type of underlying conflict, 
there were no resolution mechanisms being applied. 
 
Aside from causing conflict at the community level, BLT also caused conflict at the family 
level. In Tapteng, there was a case of a fight between a husband and wife because the husband 
used the BLT funds on gambling and alcohol. Most family conflicts were dealt with through 
internal family solution mechanisms and some were dealt with by the village head. 
 
The relatively smooth running of BLT 2008 was not due to the improved conflict solution 
mechanisms related to problems with BLT or because conflict triggers had been dealt with in 
2005. In fact, at the time of writing the government had still not formed any mechanisms to 
deal with conflict. Instead, there are five factors that made the implementation of BLT 2008 
relatively better than that of 2005: 
a) The poor members of the community had given up and were resigned to the fact that no 
matter how long they struggled with regards to BLT, they never succeeded. In their 
opinion, complaints or any form of protest they made had no impact whatsoever, because 
things were not decided by the village level officials. 
b) There were local conflict resolution mechanisms, such as dividing some BLT funds to 
nonbeneficiaries, as occurred in Cianjur and Demak. The division of funds to nonbeneficiaries 
is a response from the community apparatus and leaders in relation to accusations from 
nonbeneficiary parts of the community so that they too could enjoy BLT funds. Also, the 
village apparatus decided to fulfill the demands of the community in order to keep themselves 
safe as in most regions the village apparatus are always the targets of the community’s 
dissatisfaction. After these funds were divided, the condition in these areas improved and 
protests dwindled. Although this is not actually allowed, the village apparatus and community 
leaders did not want to be blamed. Their reason for their actions was that the local government 
had never offered a solution to the problem. However, for RTS these deductions caused 
their own problems. On the one hand, it was demanded that they share their funds, but on 
the other hand they very much needed those funds. Thus, this type of conflict resolution 
mechanism has its own problems, which can cause further issues in the future.  
                                                 
14“Ya udah, kalau ada program pemerintah, biar mereka saja yang kerja” 
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c) There were promises from the kecamatan apparatus that there would be a repeat of the data 
collection process for those who had not received BLT, as occurred in one kecamatan in 
Tapteng. With this expectation the community refrained from ongoing protests and 
waited for this new data collection. In September 2008, Statistics Indonesia carried out 
data collection on poor families, however this was not done to collect data on those who 
had not received BLT. Statistics Indonesia actually conducted this data collection for the 
purposes of developing a database of social protection programs in general (PPLS08). 
d) The fourth factor was because of the decrease in local political tension at the village/ 
kelurahan level in the implementation of BLT 2008 as well as the increased community 
understanding and awareness about BLT. One cause of conflict with BLT in 2005 was the 
high political climate in regions and the low level of community understanding about BLT, 
which meant that BLT was vulnerable to being politicized in the interests of certain 
parties. Moreover, SMERU’s research study on BLT 2005 (Hastuti et al., 2006) concluded 
that most protest action from the community was more to do with local politics than 
technical problems related to the implementation of BLT. During the implementation of 
BLT 2008, none of the research areas were having a local political event such as the 
election of a village/lurah head.  
Some informants considered that the amount of BLT 2008 received for only seven 
months was less than that from BLT 2005 that was received for one year. Thus, demands 
or protests were considered unworthy of the amount of money received. 
 
 
3.5 Is BLT a Negative Incentive for Participation in the Work Force? 
 
The opinion of some groups that BLT would cause beneficiaries to become lazy or to reduce 
their working hours was not proven to be correct. In fact, all RTS respondents and 
nonbeneficiary respondents rejected this claim. In all sample areas, almost all informants 
believed that BLT did not make the RTS apathetic towards working since the value of BLT 
was not enough to fulfill all living needs. Generally BLT money received by the RTS for three 
months was spent within one week, mostly on buying basic necessities. With the limited 
amount of BLT received, beneficiaries were unlikely to become lazy. The working hours of 
the RTS were only affected when they were collecting BLT, because the RTS had to collect 
their BLT funds from the post office. After receiving the money on the distribution day, they 
went back to work as usual. 
 
The attitude of most of the RTS to keep working is intensified because of the limited work 
available in their region. The availability of work is also very dependent on seasons and the 
demand from employers. In Cianjur, work for the RTS, who mostly work as farm laborers, is 
only available during the land preparation, harvest, and weeding seasons. Outside of these 
seasonal times, most farm laborers are unemployed and they can only farm land that is not 
irrigated if there is lots of rain. This is also the case with construction workers; work to build 
houses is very rare in this region, and their income is relatively larger than if they have to look 
for work outside the region, or go to Jakarta. In Tapteng, freelance laborers in rubber and 
palm oil plantations would lose their jobs if they are absent from work for a day, as the jobs 
would be taken by other laborers. 
 
A small amount of the RTS used BLT funds for business capital. However, this did not affect 
the type of business they conducted. BLT money was used to increase business capital which 
they already owned, such as to increase the number of livestock they had, increase their 
business capital in making cakes, buy farming tools, fertilizer, seeds, and so on. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF BLT AND OTHER POVERTY 
REDUCTION PROGRAMS 
 
 
Various poverty reduction programs have been carried out by the government to assist poor 
families/households. With a combination of “fish” and “teaching fishing” methods15, the 
government divided poverty reduction programs into the three following groups: 
a) Programs giving “fish” to the community , that is, allowance programs and social 
protection for targeted groups, such as BLT, Family of Hope Program (PKH), Raskin 
(Rice for the Poor), Community Health Insurance (Jamkesmas, previously Askeskin 
(Health Insurance for the Poor)) and School Operational Assistance (BOS);  
b) programs teaching the community “how to fish”, that is, community empowerment programs, 
such as the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM Mandiri); and  
c) programs helping the community so that they can have their own “fishing rods and 
boats”, such as the Development of Micro and Small Businesses (UKM). 
 
There were strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of each program. Using a 
strengths and weaknesses approach for each program, this research seeks to compare BLT 
2008 with other poverty reduction programs and to rank the programs based on the appraisals 
of the program beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries, and stakeholders. 
 
 
4.1 Program Beneficiaries 
 
In the research regions, all the program beneficiary respondents have only ever or continue to 
receive five types of poverty reduction programs carried out by the government, they are: 
BLT, Raskin, Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS and UKM, (see Table 12). Aside from these 
programs, in Tapteng there was also the Fertilizer and Seed Assistance (Bantuan Pupuk dan 
Bibit) program which was from nongovernmental sources. 
 
Table 12. Comparison of BLT 2008 and Other Programs Based on Program 
Beneficiary Assessmentsa 
a This  figure represents the number of respondents that can answer the questions concerning a certain 
program, not the  number of respondents per research area or program. 
bThis program is implemented in Tapteng. 
                                                 
15The metaphors used here are based on the saying “Give someone a fish; feed them for a day. Teach someone 
to fish; feed them for a lifetime.” 
Program Name Better The Same Worse Do Not Know N
a 
BLT 2005 18.60% 23.26% 45.35% 12.79% 86 
Raskin 18.06% 47.22% 27.78% 6.94% 72 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin 50.94% 26.42% 22.64% 0 53 
BOS 38.10% 45.24% 16.67% 0 42 
UKM 83.33% 8.33% 8.33% 0 12 
Fertilizer and Seed Assistanceb 44.44% 0 55.56% 0 9 
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Based on program beneficiary respondents’ assessments, when compared to BLT 2008, 45% 
of BLT 2005 beneficiaries stated that BLT 2005 was worse than BLT 2008. This is because 
the implementation of BLT 2008 was considered to be more orderly than BLT 2005. To 
receive BLT 2008 funds, the RTS did not have to travel to far away post offices, queue and 
jostle each other out of the way and there were no conflicts as in 2005. 
 
Nevertheless, beneficiary respondents identified a number of weaknesses of BLT 2008 as follows:  
a) There was no increase in the amount of money received compared to BLT 2005. 
b) The amount was not considered sufficient to counter balance increases in prices at the time.  
c) Compared with BLT 2005, there were larger deductions for redistribution with BLT 2008, 
which meant that the money received by the RTS was even smaller.  
d) The BLT 2008, which was planned to be distributed over seven months, was considered 
insufficient when compared with BLT 2005, which was divided over one year.  
e) Mistargeting still occurred and there were still poor households that did not receive BLT 2008. 
 
Differing from BLT 2005, the majority of Jamkesmas/Askeskin and UKM program 
beneficiaries stated that Jamkesmas/Askeskin and UKM programs were better than BLT 
2008. A number of 50.94% program beneficiaries stated that Jamkesmas/Askeskin were better 
than BLT 2008. The strength of the Jamkesmas/Askeskin programs is that the program can 
be used immediately when ill. Jamkesmas/Askeskin are of great assistance for patients who 
are in an urgent situation and cannot afford to get medical treatment from the hospital. 
Program beneficiaries who were sick felt that this free medical treatment was very useful. 
Some respondents assessed free medical treatment as being better than BLT 2008 because the 
cost of medical treatment is considered higher than the amount of money gained from BLT. 
 
The weaknesses of Jamkesmas/Askeskin, according to these respondents, are that 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin only help sick people. Some Jamkesmas/Askeskin patients stated that 
they received poor service and there were differences between the services for 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin and non-Jamkesmas/Askeskin patients. Also, there are some medicines 
for certain illnesses which cannot be compensated for using Jamkesmas/Askeskin cards. 
 
As many as 83.33% of program beneficiary respondents stated that the UKM was better 
than BLT 2008. Program beneficiaries stated that in the business capital given is useful for 
the long term and that they could be more independent. The weakness of this program is 
that not all poor people could receive the capital. Also, the large loan interest made it 
difficult to repay these loans. 
 
If the Raskin and BOS programs are compared with BLT 2008, 47.22% of respondents stated 
that Raskin and BOS programs were the same as BLT 2008, neither better nor worse. The 
reasons for this were that they could get cheap rice that could be enjoyed by everyone and so 
was more evenly spread, but the quality of the rice was poor and the rice often arrived three 
months late. Also, another weakness was that Raskin was not free. According to program 
beneficiary respondents, the money gained from BLT could be used to buy anything, while 
the amount of Raskin was too small and in some areas was only 4–5kg/month.  
 
For the BOS program, 45.24% of program beneficiary respondents stated that the BOS 
program was neither better nor worse than BLT 2008. This is because BOS was only enjoyed 
by those who had school-age children. Also, not all school costs were made free and BOS was 
not to pay for transportation to school and books. The strengths of BOS were that it helped 
pay for their children’s education, and now school is already free in some areas. 
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Based on the assessments of program beneficiary respondents of the Fertilizer and Seed 
Assistance program in Tapteng, 55.56% of these respondents stated that this program was 
worse than BLT 2008. The weaknesses with the Fertilizer and Seed Assistance program, 
according to respondents, was that (i) it was not given routinely, (ii) the amount was 
insufficient, (iii) prices were still too high, and (iv) the assistance often arrived during the non-
harvesting season. The strength of the program was the type of assistance given because the 
majority of the community members in Tapteng are farmers.  
 
Table 13. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on Program Beneficiary 
Assessmentsa 
Program Name First Ranking Second Ranking 
Third 
Ranking 
BLTb  43.08% 33.85% 13.85% 
Raskin 24.62% 33.85% 18.46% 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin 23.08% 12.31% 21.54% 
BOS 3.08% 12.31% 13.85% 
PNPM Mandiri 0   0 1.54% 
UKM 1.54% 6.15% 6.15% 
Others 4.62% 0.00% 1.54% 
aTotal number of respondents= 65. 
bReffering to both BLT 2005 and BLT 2008.  
 
From the programs that have been or are still being received, many program beneficiary 
respondents (43%) stated that BLT was the best program compared to other poverty 
reduction programs (see Table 13). The next best program was considered to be Raskin (25%) 
and Jamkesmas/Askeskin (23%). Overall, the majority of program beneficiaries preferred 
programs in the first group (the “fish” group), that is, poverty reduction programs such as 
BLT, Raskin and Jamkesmas/Askeskin rather than empowerment programs in the second and 
third groups. 
 
 
4.2 Nonbeneficiaries of the Program 
 
From the six poverty reduction programs nonbeneficiary respondents in the research areas 
knew about, only two—BLT 2005 and Raskin—could be assessed and compared with BLT 
2008 by the majority of respondents. The majority of nonbeneficiary respondents could not 
give an assessment16 of the Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS, PNPM Mandiri and UKM programs 
(see Table 14). 
 
If comparing BLT 2005 and BLT 2008, 37.50% of nonbeneficiary respondents stated that 
BLT 2005 was worse, 37.50% said the two programs were the same and only 4.17% said that 
the 2005 BLT program was better. The strengths of BLT 2008, according to nonbeneficiaries, 
was that there were no disturbances as there had been in 2005, whereas the weakness of the 
program was that there were still many poor citizens who did not receive BLT and the 
number of beneficiaries was considered to be too small. 
 
                                                 
16Nonbeneficiary respondents could not provide an assessment or were not willing to answer and provide an 
assessment.  
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Table 14. Comparison of BLT 2008 with Other Programs Based on  
Nonbeneficiary Assessmentsa 
Program Name Better The Same Worse Do Not Know Na 
BLT 2005 4.17% 37.50% 37.50% 20.83% 24 
Raskin 37.50% 29.17% 12.50% 20.83% 24 
Jamkesmas 9.52% 14.29% 4.76% 71.43% 21 
BOS 15.00% 0 0 85.00% 20 
PNPM Mandiri 5.00% 5.00% 0 90.00% 20 
UMKM 0 5.26% 0 94.74% 19 
aThese figures show the number of respondents who could answer questions about certain programs, not the 
amount of respondents per study region or per program. 
 
For the Raskin program, 37.50% of nonbeneficiaries assessed Raskin as better than BLT 2005. 
Their reasoning was that the Raskin program was more evenly spread and that prices were 
cheap. The weaknesses of Raskin were that even though the rice was cheap, the rice was often 
delivered late, and the quality of the rice was poor. 
 
Table 15. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on  
Nonbeneficiary Assessmentsa 
Program Name First Ranking 
Second 
Ranking 
Third 
Ranking 
BLTb  36.84% 21.05% 5.26% 
Raskin 31.58% 26.32% 26.32% 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin 15.79% 15.79% 26.32% 
BOS 5.26% 31.58% 10.53% 
UKM 0 0 10.53% 
Other 10.53% 5.26% 5.26% 
aNumber of respondents= 19. 
bReffering to both BLT 2005 and BLT 2008. 
 
In comparing programs that nonbeneficiaries knew about, overall the majority of 
nonbeneficiaries rated BLT, Raskin and Jamkesmas as the best poverty reduction programs 
(see Table 15). From the nineteen nonbeneficiary respondents, 37% assessed BLT as the best 
poverty reduction program, followed by Raskin and Jamkesmas/Askeskin by 32% and 16% 
respectively. As with program beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries assessed allowance programs and 
social protection programs for targeted groups as the best programs for poverty reduction 
compared to empowerment programs. 
 
 
4.3  Stakeholders 
 
For stakeholder respondents from the various poverty reduction programs implemented by 
government and nongovernment institutions, the majority of stakeholders could only assess 
and compare BLT 2005 and Raskin with BLT 2008 (see Table 16). The nine other programs 
could not be assessed and compared with BLT 2008 by the majority of stakeholder 
respondents in the research areas. 
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Table 16. Comparison of BLT 2008 and Other Programs Based on  
Stakeholder Assessmentsa 
Program Name Better The Same Worse Do Not Know 
BLT 2005 1.33% 33.33% 48.00% 17.33% 
Raskin 36.00% 32.00% 16.00% 16.00% 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin 26.67% 18.67% 17.33% 37.33% 
BOS 25.33% 8.00% 10.67% 56.00% 
PKH 9.33% 5.33% 2.67% 82.67% 
PNPM Mandiri 13.33% 12.00% 2.67% 72.00% 
UKM 17.33% 4.00% 10.67% 68.00% 
Revitalisasi Pertanian 5.33% 4.00% 2.67% 88.00% 
PEPM 9.33% 1.33% 5.33% 84.00% 
aNumber of respondents= 75. 
 
From the 75 stakeholder respondents, 48% stated that BLT 2005 was worse than BLT 2008. 
As the implementers of the BLT program, the majority of respondents felt that BLT 2008 was 
better because the implementation ran better than in 2005, and experiences from BLT 2005 
had been used as lessons learned for the program implementers. The BLT 2008 was assessed 
as being more organized and there was no conflict in most research areas. Despite this, some 
respondents still saw weaknesses with BLT 2008, such as coordination problems between 
agencies, no verification of the RTS data in some regions, and the large amount of deductions 
that were made from the funds. The fact that there are still a large number of poor households 
who have not yet received BLT caused social jealousy in the community and if there is 
inaccurate targeting usually the government apparatus become the target of the community’s 
dissatisfaction. Some stakeholder respondents also viewed BLT as only spoiling the people, 
not encouraging them to become independent and suggested that BLT be replaced with a 
different program. 
 
If compared with Raskin, a large proportion of stakeholder respondents (36%) assessed 
Raskin as better than BLT 2008. The benefits of Raskin for poor families were more obvious 
than assistance in the form of cash and Raskin did not cause conflict. The weaknesses of the 
Raskin program were considered to be that there are still irregularities in the distribution and 
that the community still has to pay to get the cheap rice. Raskin is also often late, the quality is 
poor, the amount received is not as much as what should be received, and the quota is small 
because it must be divided equally among all members of the community. 
 
For the the other programs, Jamkesmas/Askeskin, BOS, PKH, PNPM Mandiri, UKM, 
Revitalisasi Pertanian (Agricultural Revitalization) and PEPM (Coastal Communities Economy 
Program), although the majority of stakeholder respondents could not give an assessment, 
many stakeholders stated that these programs were better than BLT 2008. The Jamkesmas was 
considered better than BLT 2008 because BLT is a momentary program, while Jamkesmas 
provides long-term benefit because it can support the health of the poor and thus they can 
keep working. The weaknesses of Jamkesmas are the intricate and complicated bureaucracy, 
not all health services are free, and Jamkesmas patients get less welcoming service at health 
centers. In one region there was corruption with the use of medicines and claims from a 
hospital over fictitious patients.  
 
Stakeholder respondents considered BOS to be better than BLT 2008 because with BOS the 
children of poor families did not have to stop going to school and the targeting was also more 
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accurate. Providing free education was considered better than giving cash because the cash 
could be misused. The weakness of BOS, according to stakeholders, was that (i) the 
disbursement of funds took time so the teaching/learning process was disrupted, (ii) the BOS 
program in some areas also had not yet made schooling free, and (iii) many schools were not 
transparent in their management of BOS funds. 
 
A majority of stakeholder respondents stated that the empowerment programs such as PKH, 
PNPM Mandiri, UKM, Revitalisasi Pertanian and PEPM were better than BLT, Raskin, BOS 
and Jamkesmas. These empowerment programs are not only useful for increasing welfare, but 
also for increasing poor families’ feelings of worth in society and pride. 
 
Table 17. Ranking Poverty Reduction Programs Based on  
Stakeholder Assessmentsa 
Program Name First Ranking Second Ranking 
Third 
Ranking 
BLT  13.79% 20.69% 18.97% 
Raskin 25.86% 24.14% 10.34% 
PKH 8.62% 1.72% 1.72% 
Jamkesmas/Askeskin 8.62% 13.79% 22.41% 
BOS 1.72% 13.79% 12.07% 
PNPM Mandiri 17.24% 3.45% 8.62% 
UKM 3.45% 6.90% 5.17% 
Revitalisasi Pertanian 0 1.72% 0 
PEPM 1.72% 1.72% 0 
Other 18.97% 10.34% 6.90% 
aNumber of respondents= 58. 
 
Of these poverty reduction programs, stakeholder respondents in all research areas considered 
Raskin to be the best program (see Table 17). From these 58 respondents, approximately 26% 
stated that Raskin was the best program. The other poverty reduction programs ranked 
highest by stakeholders were PNPM Mandiri and BLT. These programs were selected by 17% 
and 14% of stakeholders respectively. In contrast with the assessments from BLT 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, stakeholders considered empowerment programs to be one 
of the best programs in tackling poverty.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Based on the study findings it can be concluded that:  
1. The BLT program is still relevant and can assist the poor community in overcoming 
shocks caused by the increased fuel price. Although the poor community felt BLT 
helped them, some implementing apparatuses stated that they objected to the program 
being continued and suggested it be replaced by a community empowerment program. 
2. Support for the continuation of the BLT program can be seen from the comparative 
analysis of BLT 2008 and other poverty reduction programs. The majority of household 
beneficiary and nonbeneficiary respondents stated that the BLT 2008 program was the 
best program because the money could be used immediately to fulfill the most urgent 
needs and the implementation was far better than that of BLT 2005.  
3. There was still some tension and conflict at the community level; however, the intensity 
was less than that of 2005. The conflicts were based on social jealousy and the lack of 
transparency in the verification process. In some regions the conflict could be reduced 
through local mechanisms such as dividing some of the BLT funds to nonbeneficiaries. 
4. Deductions to BLT funds were made at the community level with the amount tending 
to get larger and conducted systematically. This was not anticipated and was not dealt 
with by the relevant apparatus who tended to turn a blind eye. 
5. BLT did not cause laziness or changes in the working hours of the RTS. The limited 
amount of funds which could only fulfill basic necessities in the short term meant that the 
poor people had to act rationally and keep working to fulfill their increasing living needs. 
6. There were still problems with targeting and undercoverage of BLT beneficiaries 
because the verification was not as effective as it should have been. 
 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
Thus, the continuation of this program requires some improvements in the implementation, 
particularly in terms of data collection, socialization, and preventing the deductions of BLT 
funds. The following are some recommendations for improvements which must be made. 
 
a) The verification of Statistics Indonesia data collection results on the RTS needs to be 
legitimized at the community level through a village consultation process involving all 
elements of the community and presented in an official report. Prior to this, the village 
needs to socialize the names of prospective RTS through notice board announcements 
so that based on this information the community can convey any objections. The 
objections can be discussed during the village consultation process to determine 
whether these RTS are indeed eligible to receive BLT. 
 
b) The community’s understanding and awareness that BLT is only for poor families needs 
to be increased using the following steps: 
(1) Socialization at the community level needs to be broadened, especially in relation to 
the intention, objectives, mechanisms, and targeting of the program. 
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(2) Formal socialization needs to be carried out through village/dusun meetings and 
other means, and informally through religious activities, arisan (a community 
rotating savings and credit group), and other social activities. 
(3) Brochures should be distributed and posters displayed in public areas and 
information should also be disseminated through public service announcements in 
the printed and electronic media. 
 
c) In preventing deductions and levies of BLT funds for any purpose or reason 
whatsoever, including to be equally divided to reduce conflict between residents, the 
bupati/walikota17 needs to produce an official letter for circulation to the apparatus and 
agencies involved from the kabupaten/kota level to the village/kelurahan level, including 
RT/RW, which forbids deductions and levies of BLT funds. This official circulation 
letter must also be published in public places, such as the kelurahan office, places of 
worship, posyandu, food stalls, and so on. 
 
Aside from these three points, there are a number of other issues that must be considered: 
 
a) The KKB must be distributed after the verification process has been completed so that 
the KKB from the RTS which have been revoked cannot be misused. 
 
b) In relation to the disbursement of BLT funds, there needs to be: 
(1) An increase in the number of distribution points, particularly in areas which are far 
away or difficult to access; 
(2) The number of counters should be increased and special counters need to be 
available for elderly, ill and disabled RTS; and 
(3) A queuing system needs to be applied so that the process is orderly, such as using a 
number system, organizing the flow of the queues, and involving the security 
forces. 
 
c) Complaint posts need to be established at every level. 
(1) At the kabupaten/kota level the post would adhere to the tasks and function of UPP 
BLT-RTS; 
(2) At the kecamatan level the post would be the responsibility of the camat; 
(3) At the village level the post would be the responsibility of the village/lurah head and 
would be overseen by the BPD or kelurahan board, including the village youth 
organization and the community social workers. 
These complaint posts would function as places to receive complaints and solve 
emerging problems related to BLT. Problems which could not be solved would be given 
to the next level to deal with. However solutions to the problems cannot violate the 
regulations that are in place. 
 
d) There needs to be confirmation of basic tasks and relative functions of the agencies 
involved in the UPP BLT-RTS, especially at the kabupaten/kota level which could be 
presented in decrees from the bupati/walikota. 
 
                                                 
17Bupati is the head of a kabupaten and the walikota is the head of a kota (similar to a mayor).  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1. An Example of Different Poverty Criteria in Two Villages in Tapteng 
 
Desa Pearaja Desa Mombang Boru  
Very Poor 
(20%) 
Poor 
(70 %) 
Very Poor 
 (20%) 
Poor 
(70 %) 
- House has a dirt floor, 
roof made out of sago 
palms, 4x5m in size, 
sometimes rented or 
lent out without the land 
being rented 
- Many children 
- Parents have a 
maximum education of 
primary school, children 
have not yet graduated 
- Receive medical 
treatment from the 
dukun (local medical 
practitioner) or village 
midwife 
- Mostly are migrants 
- Work as tappers, 
freelance laborers 
- Own no land, rice fields 
rented from rich people 
- Buy one clothing 
ensemble per year 
- Use MCK (public 
bathing, washing,and 
toilet facilities) 
 
 
- Semi permanent 
house, iron roofing, 
5x6m or 4x6m in size 
- Have one bicycle 
- Have coconut trees 
- Have rice field, 
plantation, max 1ha in 
total 
- Receive medical 
treatment at the 
puskesmas 
(community health 
center), use Askeskin 
(Health Insurance for 
the Poor) and go to a 
dukun 
- Their children are 
schooled to junior 
high school level 
(maximum) 
- Lighting is 450 watts 
- Work as freelance 
laborers on rich 
people’s land, or 
bejak motor 
(motorcycle pedicab, 
rented from the 
owner) to make 
enough to meet daily 
needs 
- Education is usually 
primary school 
graduate and 
sometimes have not 
graduated from 
primary school 
- Water sourced from a 
well 
- Use MCK facilities 
- Have 5 to 15 children 
- Maximum income 
Rp1,000,000 
- Buy 1–2 items of 
clothing per year 
-  Very simple house, 
shack, roof made out of 
sago palms, dirt floor, 
bamboo walls, 3x4m in 
size, not all houses are 
self-owned 
- Have no electricity 
- Have to go to the river to 
get water 
- Livelihood gained as a 
freelance laborer on 
someone else’s 
plantation 
- Have ≥ 5 children 
because they have a low 
education level 
- Receive medical 
treatment from the 
dukun and posyandu 
-  Their children often 
migrate to seek a better 
life 
- Often ill 
- Often receive help from 
others to fulfill daily 
needs 
- Total income ≤ 
Rp250,000/ month, and 
even this is not certain 
 
 
-  House made from 
board, space 
underneath the house 
(dilapidated), roof of 
sago palms, dirt floor, 
size of house 6x5m, no 
electricity 
- Water source is a well, 
nonpermanent MCK 
facilities outside the 
house 
- Children educated to 
junior high school level 
but some do not 
graduate 
- Own 1ha of rice fields 
which can be farmed, 
but they often flood 
and cannot afford 
fertilizer 
- Receive medical 
treatment from the 
dukun 
- Eat 2x a day, 
consumption is only 
salted fish  
- Go to the market once 
every 3 months 
- Freelance laborer 
- Do not own a 
motorcycle or bicycle 
- Income is ≤ 
Rp700,000/month and 
even this is not certain  
 
 
 
Source: Results from Classification FGDs in Desa Pearaja, Kecamatan Sorkam and Desa Mombang Boru, Kecamatan 
Sibabangun, Kabupaten Tapteng. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2. Uses of BLT 2008 Funds (Percentages) 
 
Use   Tapanuli Tengah Cianjur Demak Bima Ternate Total 
Clothes 
Min 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 70.0 10.0 
Max 0.0 15.0 0.0 35.0 70.0 70.0 
Mean 0.0 12.5 0.0 19.9 70.0 22.4 
N 0.0 2 0.0 11 1 14 
Consumption 
Min 16.0 4.0 23.0 4.0 30.0 4.0 
Max 100.0 83.0 50.0 66.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 48.6 34.7 35.6 43.8 60.6 44.9 
N 11 19 5 24 13 72 
School Costs 
Min 33.0 1.0 10.0 8.0 50.0 1.0 
Max 66.0 34.0 50.0 33.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 49.5 13.2 20.8 20.3 83.3 27.9 
N 2 4 5 15 3 29 
Seek Health 
Treatment 
Min 66.0 0.0 16.0 10.0 53.0 10.0 
Max 100.0 0.0 16.0 33.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 87.0 0.0 16.0 19.7 77.7 61.9 
N 5 0.0 1 3 3 12 
Pay Off Debts 
Min 66.0 3.0 8.0 16.0 0.0 3.0 
Max 100.0 100.0 8.0 83.0 0.0 100.0 
Mean 83.0 23.1 8.0 30.5 0.0 30.8 
N 2 10 1 13 0.0 26 
Increase capital 
Min 56.0 16.0 NA 43.0 20.0 16.0 
Max 56.0 16.0 NA 43.0 66.0 66.0 
Mean 56.0 16.0 0.0 43.0 46.2 42.8 
N 1 1 0.0 1 4 7 
Village 
Apparatus/Post 
Office Deductions 
Min 1.0 16.0 33.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 
Max 3.0 66.0 66.0 6.0 0.0 66.0 
Mean 1.5 33.8 45.5 3.7 0.0 23.8 
N 4 20 6 12 0.0 42 
Electricity 
Min 16.0 1.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 1.0 
Max 16.0 16.0 6.0 10.0 6.0 16.0 
Mean 16.0 8.0 6.0 8.7 6.0 8.6 
N 1 4 1 3 1 10 
Transport 
Expenses 
Min 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
Max 10.0 13.0 0.0 3.0 40.0 40.0 
Mean 5.6 5.2 0.0 2.9 12.8 6.0 
N 7 12 0.0 15 9 43 
continued 
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continued 
Use   Tapanuli Tengah Cianjur Demak Bima Ternate Total 
KTP (Identity 
Card) 
Min 0.0 5.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
Max 0.0 8.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 8.0 
Mean 0.0 6.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 4.6 
N 0.0 3 0.0 1 0.0 4 
Zakat (Tithe) 
Min 0.0 1.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 1.0 
Max 0.0 1.0 0.0 16.0 0.0 16.0 
Mean 0.0 1.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 8.7 
N 0.0 1 0.0 3 0.0 4 
House 
Improvements 
Min 66.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 33.0 
Max 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 89.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.7 84.3 
N 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 7 
Cigarettes 
Min 6.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 
Max 13.0 16.0 4.0 10.0 3.0 16.0 
Mean 9.5 6.0 3.5 6.2 2.3 5.4 
N 2 3 2 4 3 14 
Mobile Phone 
Credit 
Min 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Max 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Mean 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
N 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
Other 
Min 66.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Max 66.0 91.0 0.0 33.0 1.0 91.0 
Mean 66.0 25.7 0.0 10.8 1.0 16.0 
N 1 4 0.0 14 1 20 
Total 
Respondents    18 22 6 25 19 90 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3, 2008 on the 
Implementation of the Direct Cash Transfer Program for Targeted Households 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
28/HUK/2008 on Guidelines for PT Pos Indonesia and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
as the Funds Distributors for the Direct Cash Transfer for Targeted Households 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 Decree of the Bupati of Tapanuli Tengah No. 537.2/Sosnakertrans/2008 30 June 
2008 on the Determination of the Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah Direct Cash Transfer 
Program Implementing Unit (UPP-BLT) 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah Statistics Indonesia Document on the BLT 2008 
Program and the Verification and Update of the Targeted Households Database 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Decree of the Head of the Kabupaten Cianjur Civil Records, Demography, Labor, 
and Social Affairs Agency No. 466.1/1729/DSTKC on the Formation of the Direct 
Cash Transfer Program Implementing Unit for Targeted Households (UPP-BLT) 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
Decree of the Demak Bupati No. 420/369/2007 on the Coordination and 
Implementing Team for the Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program (PKPS 
BBM), Kabupaten Demak, 2007 Budget Year 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
Decree of the Head of the Social Affairs Office Number 326, 2008 on the Formation 
of the BLT-RTS Program Implementing Unit in Kabupaten Bima, 2008 Budget Year 
 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute  76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute  77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute  78 
 
APPENDIX 10 
 
Decree of the Head of Social Affairs Office Number 327, 2008 on the Formation of 
Coordination Meeting Committee for the Direct Cash Transfer Program for Targeted 
Households at the Kabupaten Bima Level, 2008 Budget Year 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
Decision of the BLT-RTS Coordination Meeting, Kabupaten Bima, 2008 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
Decision of the Ternate Walikota Number 151, 2008 on the Formation of a 
Coordination Team for the Direct Cash Transfer for Targeted Households Program 
Implementing Unit (UPP BLT-RTS) Kota Ternate 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
Example of a Coupon from the Direct Cash Transfer Program 
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